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C
H A P T E R - 6 D.C.P.
: SHRI
U.K. KATNA 6.1.
West District of Union Territory of Delhi borders Haryana and
had three Sub-Divisions and nine Police Stations under its jurisdiction.
Shri U.K. Katna (28.9.83 to 8.7.85) was Deputy Commissioner of
Police of this District. The
details of the three Sub-Divisions are indicated below: - I)
SUB DIVISION PUNJABI BAGH A.C.P.
: SHRI J.K. SAXENA.
1.
P.S. Punjabi Bagh, SHO : Inspector Ram Chandra,
From 13.4.81 to 15.2.85.
2.
P.S. Nangloi, SHO
: Inspector Ram Pal Singh
3.
P.S. Sultanpuri, SHO
: Inspector Hari Ram Bhatti
4.
P.S. Mangolpuri, SHO
: Inspector Rajinder Singh, ii. SUB
DIVISION TILAK NAGAR ACP
: Shri jagmal Singh
1.
P.S. Tilak nagar, SHO
: Inspector Jagdish Chand Sharma, from 16.3.83 to 2.9.85
2.
P.S. Janakpuri, SHO
: Inspector Sheodeen Singh, From
6.7.84 to 15.2.85.
3.
P.S. Najafgarh, SHO : Inspector
Hawa Singh, ACP:
Shri Sajjan Singh
1.
P.S. Moti Nagar, SHO
: Inspector Ved Parkash
2.
P.S. Rajouri Garden, SHO
: Inspector Prem Nath Arora, From 6.2.
This District was also very badly affected during November 1984
riots. According to Delhi
Administration, apart from large number of incidents of arson and loot,
the total number of deaths in this District was 616.. The Citizen’s Justice Committee placed the number of deaths
around 904 before Misra Commission.
As the subsequent discussion will show, a number of dead bodies
were systematically removed or burnt down either by the mob or the police.
Therefore, it is not possible to come to any exact figure of
deaths. Perhaps the figure
indicated by the Citizen’s Justice Committee would be nearer the truth. 6.3.
Evidence forthcoming clearly indicates that the local leaders
and the police, especially the SHOs were working in unison.
The leaders were freely moving around making speeches and instigating
the mobs to indulge in arson, loot and killing.
There is plenty of evidence to show that the local SHOs as well
as other police staff were hand in glove with them.
This would partly explain the lack of action on the part of the
police. At certain places,
the local SHOs and other staff were not only directly involved but also
instigated the mob to indulge in nefarious activities. 6.4.
Out of9 Police Stations, the police staff if perhaps only two,
viz. Rajouri Garden and Moti Nagar Police stations remained neutral
and impartial. The other
seven Police Stations were badly affected.
Although there were 12 deaths in Rajouri Garden and 7 deaths
in Moti Nagar (according to Delhi Administration) the police records
indicate that the SHOs of these two Police Stations, managed to contain
the trouble. No personal allegations have been made against any police official
of these two Police Stations either in the Misra Commission or before
this Committee. Therefore,
no specific recommendations are made in respect of the police personnel
of these two Police Stations.
The events in the other seven Police Stations are discussed in
the fo0llowing paragraphs in detail: - SHO
: Inspector Ram Chander, From 13.4.81
to 15.2.85 ACP
: Shri J.K. Saxena,From 2.11.81
to 14.2.85 6.5.
Punjabi Bagh Police Station located on the out-skirts of Delhi
has a mixed population, with a few colonies of upper and middleclass
and some rural pockets. Three
Police Posts in its jurisdiction are: Shakurbasti; Madipur, and Anand
Vas. AFFIDAVITS
RECEIVED IN BEFORE MISRA COMMISSION 6.6.
A large number of affidavits received by the Misra Commission
indicate that local leaders were involved in the incidents of arson
and violence. They were
not checked by the local police who appeared to be siding with them.
A number of these deponents
had been cross-examined by the Commission.
Some of the important affidavits giving a picture of the incidents
in this area are those given by Shri Tulsi Ram (160); Shri Kuldip Singh
(2272); Shri Gurcharan Singh (2274); Shri Virendra Singh (2278); Sh.
Pal Singh (2276); Shri Ladhu Ram (2287); Shri Amarjit Singh (2382);
Smt. Boori Bhai (2419); Shri Gulshan Singh (2461); Shri Angad Singh
(2675); Smt. Gurbir Kaur (2749); Smt. Prakash Kaur (167). 6.7
From the affidavits, the picture which emerges is that the local
leaders were roaming around in a white car and a Bullet motorcycle.
The police jeep was also moving along with these local leaders.
Gurudwaras were attacked in the morning on 1.11.84 and movable
property of the Gurudwaras was taken away in two trucks and a matador.
The sewadars of Gurudwara Tikana Sahib went to the Police Station
for protection but they were beaten up on the instructions of the local
leader. Affidavits of Shri
Gurcharan Singh (2274) and Shri Gulshan Singh (2461) are relevant in
this connection. Both these
deponents were cross-examined by Misra Commission. 6.8
After setting the Gurudwara on fire, the mob led by the leaders
set fire to Guru Nanak Public School between 11.00 and 12.00 hrs on
the same day. Ladhu Ram,
the peon of Guru Nanak Public School (2287) and Shri Kuldip Singh (2272),
has testified to this. According
to them, Head Constable Hamid Khan misappropriated a part of the loot.
At about 11.20 AM, Guru Singh Sabha in Bhagwan Dass Nagar in
East Punjabi Bagh was set on fire.
(Affidavits of Shri Amarjit Singh (2382) and Shri Angad Singh
(2675). Shri Pal Singh (2276) stated that his house was attacked and
he fired a few rounds
in the air from his licensed pistol to scare the mob.
His statement is corroborated by Shri Kuldip Singh (2272).
However, on hearing the sound of firing, two DTC buses and two
mini buses carrying a large number of people came.
These were followed by a police vehicle.
Being out-numbered Shri Pal Singh managed to escape from the
back door and later he was arrested on 3.11.84 and a case registered
against him for murder. Smt.
Prakash Kaur (167) and Smt. Boori
Bhai (2419) also gave vivid description of the attack in their
area. AFFIDAVITS
FILED BEFORE THE COMMITTEE 6.9
Only two affidavits have been filed before the Committee which
are of a general nature. Inderjit
Singh (107) and Shri Manjit Singh (185) have described police inaction
and the fact that their FIRs were not properly recorded and no subsequent
follow-up was done by the police. SEQUENCE
OF EVENTS 6.10
There was no trouble on 31st October 1984.
However, on 1.11.84, incidents of arson and looting started in
rapid succession. Gurudwaras
were the main targets followed by Guru Nanak Public School.
At 11.20 AM, Gurudwara in Bhagwan Dass Nagar was set ablaze followed
by attack on Gurudwara in ‘A’ Block Madipur at 12.40 PM.
At about 1.00 PM. There was a serious incident in Samrat Enclave
when some member of the Sikh Community started firing at the mob from
the roof top of house No. C-64, Raj Nagar in which a number of persons
including three inmates of the -----------(two males and one female)
were killed according 1450 hrs, the crowd looted Madipur.
At 1540 hrs, shops in P&T Colony were looted.
At about the same time, the mob tried to set some trucks on fire
in Paschim Puri Enclave. At
1720 hrs, Kothi No.33, Road No.1 Punjabi Bagh was set ablaze.
On 2nd November 1984, there were incidents of rioting
near Samrat Cinema, Shakarpur and one truck was looted and set on fire
at Madhuban Chowk. On 3.11.84,
one house near Shivaji Park School was set ablaze.
Incidents of violence continued upto4.11.84 as would be clear
from the messages in the Log Book of this Police Station. FIR'
s 6.11
Although there have been large number of incidents of arson,
looting and even killings, only 1 FIR No. 511 was registered by Inspector
Ram Chander SHO, Punjabi Bagh at 1.00 PM. On 1.11.84. This is a general FIR, which mentions rioting by both communities.
This is of a very general nature and clearly indicates the bias
of the SHO against the Sikhs in general.
Interestingly, as has been pointed out during the arguments before
Misra Commission, this FIR was recorded in more or less the same language
as FIR NO. 351/84 of Police Station Nangloi and FIR No. 176/84 of Police
Station Mangolpuri. Apparently, the three SHOs decided to record similar FIRs by
mutual consultation or under directions from their superiors.
Otherwise it would not have been possible for them to use similar
phrases and language. POLICE
ACTION 6.12 During
the entire period of the riots, ---------------------------- and no
arrests were made in this Police Station under substantive offences.
Besides, no preventive arrests were made from 31st
October to2nd November 1984. It is only on 3.11.84 that 12 preventive arrests are shown
to have been made. Throughout
the period, there is no mention of any lathi charge to control the mobs.
Tear-gas shells were used only at one place in Samrat Enclave
when the Sikhs resorted to firing in self-defense on 1.11.84.
There is mention of some police firing which was allegedly done
in the air. The sequence of events as they emerge from the various reports
and log books of the police appear to be as follows: 6.13
House No. C-64, Raj Nagar, Samrat Enclave was gheraoed by an
unruly mob of 20-30 thousand people at about 1.00 PM on 1.11.84.
SHO, Punjabi Bagh states that he rushed to the spot at about
13.24 hrs and he sent a message to West District Control requesting
for additional force and tear-gas. Meanwhile, ACP reached and he found the house had been set
on fire. Thereafter, both
SHO and ACP continued to send messages through wireless to West District
Control for force and tear-gas.
ACP also made repeated requests from 1330 hrs onwards to DCP
to visit the spot in the interest of the morale of the subordinate staff.
The additional force and
tear-gas arrived at 14.30 hrs.
The ACP used the tear-gas shells to disengage the mob.
Fifty-two rounds of .303 and 9 rounds of revolver were also fired
by the police. After the
firing when the police reached the roof of the house they found 3 dead
bodies (2 male and 1 female) lying on the roof.
ACP in his report-dated 14.11.84 further reports that 3 infant
children were found hidden behind one barsati one they were handed over
to their grand mother. 6.14
Apparently,
the inmates died as a result of police firing.
DCP arrived on the spot at 14.55 hrs i.e. nearly full2 hours
after the trouble started and nearly one-hour and25 minutes after the
ACP specifically requested the DCP to reach the spot.
Although a number of people died there in the incident, the DCP
stated in his report dated 31.12.84 that no one was killed in this incident
as a result of police firing which is incorrect.
The police did not register any FIR regarding this incident in
spite of the casualties, which is not understandable. 6.15
That
the police action was totally ineffective is also clear from the fact
that the mobs continued their nefarious activities unchecked and the
situation was not controlled even in places where the ACP and DCP were
present. On the other hand,
in the arguments of the Delhi Administration before Misra Commission
a misleading impression has been given that the police was very active
and 10 cases were registered under various sections of the IPC and the
Arms Act. Besides, 40 persons
were arrested in specific offences and 66 persons were arrested under
preventive sections. This
is not borne out by the facts as during the period of the riots only
one FIR was registered and till the 3rd of November 1984,
no arrests whatsoever were made. Action taken after the riots perhaps has been included to give
a rosy picture, which is far from the truth. DEATHS 6.16
The total number of deaths according to Delhi Administration
was 27, whereas police records shot about 24.
From this it is clear that although the number of deaths was
not large the incidents of looting and arson were numerous and remained
unchecked. DISCUSSION 6.17
The reports of the various officers from SHO upward give an impression
that not only did the police take no action to control or contain the
situation, but they acted in a partisan manner.
This becomes evident from the evidence of various deponents to
the fact that police vehicles were present in the initial stages when
the Gurudwaras and Sikhs were attacked in the morning on 1.11.84.
The report of the SHO dated
18.11.84 has described the attack on Sikh houses in Samrat Enclave,
Raj Nagar. In the report
he has stated that there was a mob of 20 to 30 thousand people at 1.00
PM. Yet he goes on to say that there was unprovoked firing from the
rooftops and four persons were reported killed due to the same.
If 20 to 30 thousand people attacked someone’s house, firing
in self-defense cannot be termed as unprovoked, since every citizen
has a right for self-defense.
The SHO has not indicated how the police tried to control or
handled the situation. If
anything, his report gives the impression that since the Sikhs were
firing in self-defense, tear-gas shells were used by
the police to flush them out to their houses.
ACP (Punjabi Bagh) and DCP (West) were also present at the spot. In report, the 20 rounds of revolver were fired at Raj Nagar
under orders of ACP. However,
no casualty took place due to this firing.
This is incorrect as has been discussed earlier in Para 6.13
because there were a number of casualties. 6.18 An interesting message of ACP, Punjabi Bagh,
sent at 1450 hrs reads as follows “There
is a gathering of thousands at the spot which had gheraoed the house
and action will be started after 10 minutes.
He requested the DCP (West District) to come at the spot so that
the morale of the force is kept up.”
The above message clearly indicates the reluctance of the SHO
and the ACP to take prompt action to control the situation.
ACP sent repeated messages from 1330 hrs to DCP to visit the
spot but after so many messages, DCP Shri Katna leaves for the spot
at 1403 hrs (according to his own statement) and instead of rushing
to the spot, he goes to Moti Nagar and Rajouri Garden and ultimately
reaches Samrat Enclave at 1455 hrs.
In spite of this serious incident having taken place, no separate
FIR was registered. 6.19
Guru Nanak Public School was set ablaze by the mob at about 11.00
AM on 1.11.84. This incident
has been left out in the reports of ACP and DCP.
The SHO makes a mention of this incident but only shows his visit
in the afternoon. Apparently,
the ACP Punjabi Bagh and DCP were present at the time when the Gurudwara
in Bhagwan Dass Nagar was looted and burnt as well as at the time of
the incident of setting fire to the Public School but the action
taken by them is not indicated.
There was perhaps no will on their part to take any effective
action. Not mentioning
many of the incidents gives a clear indication that there was a definite
and deliberate attempt to minimize the incidents in this Police Station.
Not only the police was inactive, they were also, as discussed
above, siding with rioters and seemed to be under pressure from the
local leaders; hence their partisan attitude. RECOMMENDATIONS 6.20
While the role of
the ACP and DCP will be discussed separately, it is clear that the SHO
was inactive, failed to control the situation and permitted arson, looting
and killings to continue. He
failed to behave as a member of the disciplined force and it is, therefore,
recommended that departmental proceedings for major penalty should be
initiated against him. 6.21
It is understood that DCP (West) initiated some action against
Head Constable Hamid Khan for misappropriation of looted property but
the outcome of the inquiry is not known.
This needs to be further pursued.
SHO : Inspector Ram Pal Singh from 20.9.83 to15.2.85 ACP: Shri J.K. Saxena AFFIDAVITS
BEFORE THE MISRA COMMISSION 6.23
A large number of affidavits filed before the Misra Commission
give a graphic description of the events, which took place during the
riots. There was no trouble
in this area on 31st October 1984.
However, a meeting of the local leaders is said to have taken
place during the night intervening 31st October, 1984 and
1st November, 1984. Thereafter,
the incidents of arson, loot, violence and killing took place in quick
succession. 6.24
Two of the many deponents, viz., Smt. Surinder Kaur (2582) and
Shri Gurbachan Singh (2310) were also cross-examined by the misra Commission. SMT.
GURDIP KAUR (2307)----- whose son is a member of the Youth Congress
(I), has stated that she was informed that a meeting was held in the
colony in which it had been decided that the Sardars were to be killed
and the Gurudwaras burnt. She
has described in detail how the attack started and Sikh men and women
tried to hide in different places.
One of her neighbours informed them that three truckloads of
persons had come from neighbouring villages and they were coming towards
their house. One of the
neighbours advised them to hide and the men-folk hid in a tube well.
They were, however, attacked and burnt alive.
She has given the names of a number of persons whom she recognizes
and who were part of the crowd.
According to her, the crowd was being paid for the killings at
the rate of Rs. 50/- per killing and a bottle of liquor.
A number of families were given.
Even on the 4thof November 1984, she saw two dead bodies lying
on the ground which were being burnt. 6.25.1
SHRI GURBACHAN SINGH (2310)------ has described how crowds came
in Haryana Roadways buses and indulged in arson, loot and killing.
According to him, the attacks continued till 3rd November
1984. At the Police Station,
where some Sikhs were escorted, they were forced to have their hair
cut. No action was taken
when after the riots a report was lodged at the Police Station naming
the ringleaders. 6.25.2
Similar details of attacks have been given by Smt. Krishna (2337);
Smt. Updesh Kaur (2555); Smt. Gurcharan Kaur (2557); Smt. Partap kaur(2558);
Smt. Surender Kaur (2582); Shri Ishar Singh (2608); Smt. Kuldip Kaur
(2538); Shri Puran Singh (2797); Shri Mohinder Singh (2556); Smt. Sushil
Kaur (2817); Smt. Gurdeep Kaur (2307) and many others. AFFIDAVITS
RECEIVED BEFORE THE COMMITTEE 6.25.3
Only one affidavit has been received by the Committee.
This is an affidavit of Shri Gurbachan Singh Saluja (213/87).
He was running a shop at Chowk Piragarhi, Rohtak Road.
He has described that his business establishment was looted and
badly damaged by the miscreants and the local police did not stop the
mob nor took any action on his report. DISCUSSION 6.26
A study of the affidavits and the police records indicate that
a large number of persons had come by road and train from outside.
As usual, they were set on fire and thereafter houses of individual
Sikhs were attacked. A number of attempts were made by various persons particularly
the ladies to go to the Police Station and seek help but the response
was negative. In some cases,
the ladies went to the Police Station Punjabi Bagh but here also they
were turned
Away. Incidents of killing continued right up to the 3rd
of November 1984. 6.27
The most serious incident was the killing of 9 Sikhs hiding inside
a tube-well. Gruesome burning
alive of two young girls has been described in the affidavit of Shri
Ishar Singh (2608); Smt. Gurcharan Kaur (2557) and Shri Gurcharan Singh
(2310). Apparently, the
police were moving around in civilian clothes, according to Smt. Gurcharan
Kaur (2557), and instead of protecting the victims the police seemed
to be part of the mob. (Shri
Joginder Singh- 1521). Smt.
Pratap Kaur (2558) has stated that the police was pointing out the houses
of the Sikhs. She went to the Police Station to lodge a complaint but the
police paid no heed. Smt.
Krishna (2337) was asked by the police to run away when she went with
her complaint. She counted
over 100 Sikh bodies on the roads and lanes. DEATHS 6.28
According to the Delhi Administration, about 122 persons were
killed within the jurisdiction of this Police Station.
The Citizen’s Justice Committee in their statement put the figures
at 146. However, in the
police Station records there is mention of 2.11.84.
Since a number of dead bodies were disposed of by burning as
per the graphic description of the various deponents, the overall figure
of deaths in this Police Station could be anywhere between 140 and 150. POLICE
STATION 6.29
As in the case of Punjabi Bagh and Mangolpuri Police Stations
in this P.S. also only one FIR No. 351/84 was registered on 1.11.84
at 4.05 PM. Which covers all the incidents.
In his reply dated 7.2.85 to various questions put to SHO Inspector
Ram Pal Singh, vague reasons have been given for this illegal action.
During the riots, no arrests were made under substantive offences.
No preventive arrests were made on 1st and 2nd November
1984 and only 5 persons are shown to have been arrested under preventive
sections on 3.11.84. Lathi
charge was not resorted to on the 1st of November 1984 and the Daily
Diary entry indicates lathi charge only at one place on 2nd
November 1984. Police was
obviously ineffective because no one was hurt or injured and incidents
continued right up to 3rd of November 1984. 6.30
On the other hand, Delhi Administration in their arguments before
Mira Commission has given a difference picture, which is not borne out
by facts. According to
Delhi Administration, 5 Firs were registered; 13 persons were arrested
and 52 persons were arrested under preventive sections.
These arrests were certainly not made during the period of the
riots and give a misleading picture of the police action. RECOMMENDATIONS
6.33. Although
no specific allegations have been made against individual police officers,
the study of the records and the affidavits indicate absolute police
apathy and inaction. There
is ample evidence that deponents especially women went to the Police
Stations but they were turned away.
What to talk of giving protection, even their FIRs were not recorded.
Had the police taken effective action, violence could not have
continued right up to 3rd November 1984.
The SHO of this Police Station apparently abdicated his charge
and the mobs continued to do exactly what they wanted.
He is squarely responsible for the total failure and breakdown
of the police administration
in this Police Station and it is recommended that disciplinary
action for major penalty is initiated against him.
SHO
: Inspector H.R.Bhatti,(2.11.84
to 19.11.84) ACP
: Shri J.K. Saxena 6.34.
Police Station Sultanpuri mainly covers resettlement colonies
with sizable Sikh population. AFFIDAVITS
RECEIVED IN THE MISRA COMMISSION 6.35.
A large number of affidavits relating to this a number of deponents
were also cross-examined. Some of those who were cross-examined were: Smt. Durjan Kaur
(2293); Smt. Jatan Kaur (2405); Smt. Banto Kaur (2424); Smt. Anek Kaur
(2427); Smt. Gopi Kaur (2430); Smt. Asudi Bai (2606); and Shri Bhag
Singh (2686). The Misra
Commission also had the statements of some deponents investigated through
its-investigating agency. A
number of other deponents had also given graphic descriptions of he
sequence of events in this Police Station during the riots, which will
be discussed subsequently. SEQUENCE
OF EVENTS 6.36.
A study of the affidavits and police records indicate that there
was no serious incident of violence in this Police Station on 31.10.84.
However, in the morning of 1st November 1984, a local Member
of Parliament addressed a meeting which was also attended by SHO Inspector
Bhatti and other police officers of Sultanpuri.
In this meeting, the gathering was instigated to take revenge
on the Sikhs. Immediately
thereafter, violence started with full fury.
An attack on the Gurudwara in Budh Vihar was
followed by arson and looting in Blocks A & C.
In Blocks ‘A’, a number of shops belonging to Sikhs were set
ablaze. In Block ‘C’, a Gurudwara was set on fire.
In this very incident, an elderly Sikh named Tota Singh was beaten
up by the mob and some witnesses saw SHO Shri Bhatti firing at Tota
Singh with his service revolver. Tota Singh was removed to hospital in a serious condition where
he succumbed to injuries. Violence
spread to other areas and continued unabated also on 2nd
and 3rd November 1984. 6.37.
It seems the pattern, that was followed, was that first the SHO
Shri Bhatti and Head Constable Jai Chand ordered and threatened the
Sikhs to go inside their houses otherwise they would shoot them.
After the Sikhs went inside the houses, they were attacked by
the mobs with the full connivance of the police.
(Affidavits of Smt. Jatan Kaur –2405; Guddi Kaur- 2680; Chal
Kaur-2698; and Shri Moti Singh –2403.) The SHO was allegedly leading
the mob and pointing out the houses of the Sikhs.
(Affidavits of Ramesh Kaur –2619; Shri Sangat Singh –2493; Smt.
Gopi Kaur – 2430 & 2545; Smt. Prem Kaur –2475; Smt. Gulbano Kaur
– 2417; and Smt. Guddi Kaur-2680). The SHO was not only leading the mob but also firing at the
Sikhs and killing them. He
had allegedly fired at Roshan Singh and said, ‘No Sikh can go from here
alive while am here’. Havaldar
Jai Chand was alleged to have fired at Jarnail Singh and killed him.
(Affidavits of Moti Singh –2403; Smt. Prem Kaur- 2474; Smt. Salawati
Kaur –2533.) Shri Pinia Singh
(2375) and Smt. Gopi Kaur (2430) also alleged that Tota Singh
was shot by Shri Bhatti. Shri Bhag Singh (2686) has given evidence to the effect that
SHO Bhatti told the deponent that he had been ordered to disarm the
Sikhs and took the4 deponent’s gun. 6.38.
The police subsequently refused to record the FIRs of the victims.
(Affidavits by Shri Kalia – 2348 and Smt. Rajni Devi – 2349.)
Sikhs were also humiliated and asked to shave off their hair at the
Police Station. (Smt. Anek
Kaur –2427. Smt. Salawati
Kaur – 2533 and Smt. Gopi Kaur – 2430 & 2545.) The Police disposed
some of the dead bodies of the victims off by carrying them away in
tempos and by burning. (Smt.
Durjan Kaur –2293; Shri Moti Singh – 2403; Smt. Rajni Devi – 2349; and
Smt. Jatan Kaur – 2405.) It
seems that to ensure that the victims could not escape and the killers
were not identified, the electricity was switched off. (Affidavits of
Teedee Kaur – 2426 and Smt. Film Kaur – 2428). 6.39.
Some Sikhs, who were considered to be influential or could subsequently
create trouble, were isolated and taken to the Thana.
According to Shri Pinia Singh (2375), the SHO had been acting
as follows: -
“ At about 10.00 AM. On 1.11.84, a mob of about 2,000 persons
attacked us. In the meantime
the police arrived. SHO
Bhatti Saheb took us to the Police Station.
Other Sikhs were also present there in the Police Station.
Bhatti Saheb said that you 15-20 persons who have come here were
safe and you will see what happens with others.
We saw outside slaughtering was being done.
Police was just watching.” 6.40.
The affidavits which were investigated by the Misra Commission
through the investigating agency also indicate that the
allegations made by the deponents were by and large correct. AFFIDAVITS
FILED BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE 6.41.
Seventeen affidavits have been received before the Committee.
These affidavits appreciate the some Sikh families.
Considering the overwhelming evidence against the SHO, these
affidavits do not carry any weight. DEATHS 6.42.
According to Delhi Administration, the number of deaths in PS
Sultanpuri was 201 whereas according to the affidavits filed by the
Citizens’ Justice Committee the figure would be 379.
There is enough evidence to show that dead bodies were being
burnt or systematically removed soon after the killings.
Even the SHO in his statement at one place has accepted that
it was not possible to conduct postmortem on all the bodies because
quite a few have been burnt. Since
the disposal of most of the dead bodies were done in such a manner,
as not to leave any trace, there is no doubt that the deaths in this
Police Station might
have been more. The claims
made are not necessarily the correct picture, as many people ran away
not to return. 6.43.
A number of people of West District fled away in fear to Alwar
(Rajasthan) and were too scared of harassment by police and local leaders
that they were reluctant to return to Delhi.
The Delhi Administration had this matter examined in some depth
by the then Deputy Commissioner Shri R.S. Sethi, who after inquiries
at Alwar submitted a detailed report dated 17.12.84 which was passed
on to the then Police. FIR'
s 6.44. Despite large number of incidents of killings,
looting and arson, only 2 FIRs were registered – one each on 1st and
3rd November 1984 respectively.
These are of a general nature.
In FIR No. 250 of1.11.84 even killings have not been
mentioned. The effort
of the local police throughout was to minimize and conceal the incidents
deliberately. POLICE
ACTION 6.45.
During the entire period of the riots, and, in spite of the fact
that large-scale killings, arson and loot was taking place, not a single
arrest was made under substantive offences.
No preventive arrests were made on 31.10.84 and 1st and 2nd
November 1984. This was
quite natural because the evidence goes to show that police was completely
in league with the mob. This
also explains why not a single tear-gas shell was fired to disperse
the crowd. Though eight
lathi charges are alleged to have been made on 1.11.84, there is no
mention of the same in the Daily Diary.
The police fired some round with revolvers/rifles etc. during
the riots not to disperse the crowd but as claimed by the deponent’s
to assist the mobs in their nefarious activities. 6.46.
Witness after witness had stated that the SHO was fully in league
with the mob and the local clearly indicate that he was constantly sending
misleading messages. In
his explanation, Shri Bhatti has mentioned that due to lack of fire
fighting vehicles and adequate force a lot of damage was caused to life
and property. He has further added that he had gone to a number of areas
and saved Sikhs at great personal risk.
He makes a very strange statement when he says that had the police
killed the rioters the mob might have looted and burnt the Police Station
as had been done on some earlier occasion.
This is a very lame excuse and shows his extreme cowardice if
nothing else. CONCLUSION 6.47.
The events of this Police Station are a slur on the name of the
local police. Not only
has the police extended no help to the affected persons but directly
involved itself with the rioters by giving them help-moral and material.
It is a shame that people like Inspector H.R.Bhatti, SHO, and
Head Constable Jai Chand are still in services and not so far prosecuted
in a court of law. There
was more than enough evidence
to successfully prosecute these
police personnel as well as local leaders responsible
for these killings. RECOMMENDATION 6.48. Both SHO H.R. Bhatti and Head Constable Jai do not
appear fit to be retained in the Police force and it would be a pity
if they were allowed to --------- any further.
After a lapse of so much time can be done is to deal with
them under Article 311(2) (b) of the Constitution for their acts
of omission and commission. SHO
: Inspector R.S. Dahiya, From
7.6.83 to 15.2.85 ACP
: Shri J.K. Saxena 6.49.
Police Station Mangolpuri comprises of23 Blocks of resettlement
colonies with a population of about 2.5 lakhs. AFFIDAVITS
FILED BEFORE THE MISRA COMMISSION 6.50.
A large number of affidavits were filed before Misra Commission
and there were specific allegations against local leaders as well as
the police staff not only of the Police Station but also senior officers
of the District. Some of
the important affidavits were of Smt. Surjit Kaur wife of Shri Beant
Singh (77); Shri Ram Saran (78); Shri Lal Singh (87); Shri Natha Singh
(88); Shri Tajwant Singh Malhotra (93); Smt. Daropati (2350); Shri Ajit
Singh (2388); Shri Gurdip Singh (2399); Shri Gurmukh Singh (2431); Shri
Radho Ram Pandey (2435); Shri Saada Singh (2437); Shri Harnam Singh
(2459); Smt. Myna Kaur (2462); Shri Amarjit Singh (2483); Smt. Mahinder
Kaur (2559); Shri Thakur Singh (2580); Shri Niranjan Singh (2587); Smt.
Agya Kaur (2607); Smt. Amrit Kaur (2630); and Shri Ahal Singh (2770). AFFIDAVITS
RECEIVED IN THE COMMITTEE 6.51.
Only one affidavit has been received in this Committee. It
has been filed by Shri Anant Singh (293/87) who has described how his
house was looted and burnt and the police did not stop the miscreants.
He has also alleged that no action was taken by the police on
the FIR lodged by him. SEQUENCE
OFEVENTS 6.52.
On an analysis of the various affidavits and the police records,
it is apparent that there was no trouble in this area on 31.10.1984.
Trouble started on 1.11.84.
The initial attacks were on the Gurudwaras in various blocks
by mobs led by local leaders.
The Gurudwaras of Block G, R, B, D, S, etc. etc. were attacked,
looted and burnt unchecked. In the evening of 1.11.84, attacks took place in Rohini Block
area. Evidence of Shri
Radho Ram Pandey (2435) is relevant in this connection.
He has stated that trouble started in the area around2.00 PM.
On 1.11.84. He was eye-witness
to the attacks and killings.
Being the Pradhan of that area, he went to the Police Station. He was told to runaway and safe his own life. The police did
not render any help.
He has named quite a few persons who were involved the riots.
Being a non-Sikh and a representative that area, his evidence
becomes quite significant. Incidents
of violence, loot, arson and killings continued even on the2ndand 3rd
. According to Surjit Kaur (77), the SHO, ACP and DCP were inci------
the killers. The
police officers were even directing
the killer’s to remove the dead bodies so that no evidence of
killings remained. Affidavits
of Shri Niranjan Singh (2587) and Shri Ajit Singh (2388) also indicate
police involvement in the killings.
When the police was specifically approached to render help, they
refused to help the deponents.
This is not only clear from the affidavits of Shri Radho Ram
Pandey (2435) but also Daropati (2350); Harnam Singh (2459) and Myna
Kaur (2462). 6.53.
The unhelpful attitude of the police is also evident from the
affidavit of Shri Ahal Singh (2770) who is a retired Class I Officer
from the ISRE Cadre who has been working as a Hony Technical Adviser
and Trustee of Amar Jyoti Charitable Trust for the benefit of physically
handicapped persons in Delhi.
He has described certain events of this Police Station.
According to him, the affected people of this area were so scared
that subsequently in spite of his efforts and contacts made with senior
officers, the riot victims were not prepared to go back to their homes.
Surprisingly, the officers who were sent for enquiries were the
same SHO and ACP who had been responsible for the killings.
Some of the victims were being threatened and chased by the assessing
according to Shri Ahal Singh.
In one incident when the deponent was complaining to the SHO,
a large number of victims came running and they were followed by the
alleged assassins. The
SHO stated that these people had been bailed out and he found himself
helpless. The deponent
complained to the Commissioner of Police Shri S.S. Jog on 23.11.84,
gave him a complete picture and also told him that the sketchy FIRs
would not do as they were inadequate for registering cases.
The affidavit of Shri Ahal Singh, who tried to help the riot
victims, is indeed Avery telling one and gives a clear picture of the
indifference and callousness of the local police. 6.54.
The affidavits of Smt. Surjit Kaur (77), Shri Ram Saran (78),
Shri Lal Singh (87) and Shri Natha Singh (88) all describe the killings
in this Police Station. The
names of the killers are well known and they are all quite notorious
characters. However, it
was only when the army came to this area on the 2nd evening
that the situation started getting normalized.
During the entire period of the riots, police presence was negligible,
ineffective and where it was present they apparently abetted with the
criminals rather than take action to control the situation.
This is also clear from the fact that they did not register the
complaints of the riot victim’s when approached by them at the Police
Station. DEATHS 6.55.
The total number of deaths in this police Station, according
to the SHO, was given as 19 initially.
This figure was later increased to 69.
The Citizens’ Justice Committee indicated a figure of 132 deaths,
whereas the Delhi Administration has identified 112 deaths.
Keeping in view the fact that the bodies of the victims were
burnt and disposed of, the figure of 132 might be nearer the truth. FIR'
s 6.56.
In spite of the large number of incidents on 1st, 2nd
and 3rd November, 1984, it is a matter of surprise that during
this entire period only one FIR No. 174 was registered in spite of the
fact that over a hundred deaths took place; a number of Gurudwaras were
looted and burnt and arson continued unabated.
Apparently, the police were concealing and playing down the incidents
so that it could not be held accountable for inaction at a later date. POLICE
ACTION 6.57.
According to the arguments of the Delhi Administration before
Misra Commission, the police of the area was very vigilant and had taken
all steps to control the situation.
Further it is mentioned that lathi charge was resorted to vigorously
to disperse the mob at many places.
The police also resorted to firing and 36 persons were arrested
under substantive offences and 79 persons were arrested under preventive
sections. Besides, 3 FIRs
were registered. 6.58.
This submission of the Delhi Administration before Misra Commission
was very misleading. The
police records indicate that no preventive arrests were made on 1st,
2nd and 3rd November 1984.
No arrests under substantive offences were made from 1st to 5th
November 1984. During the
entire period of the riots, no tear-gas was used.
Firing was not resorted to on 1st November, 1984 and even when
there is mention of the firing on 2nd and 3rd
November, according to the SHO’s own statement, it was in the air firing
was ineffective. Even lathi-charge was not resorted to on the 1st November 1984.
There is mention of lathi-charge only at two places on 2nd
November and not subsequently even though the incidents continued on
3rd November 1984.
During the entire period of the riots, only one FIR No. 174 was
registered. Other cases
might have been registered subsequently but the impression given by
the Delhi Administration was certainly misleading. 6.59.
It is clear from the above that even though outside force had
been deputed, the ‘will to act’ by the local police was completely lacking.
As a matter of fact, many of the deponents have stated that when
they went to the Police Station, they were turned away and no help was
given to them. It is only
after the army reached this Police Station that the situation started
normalizing. 6.60.
The supervisory officers, viz., ACP and DCP also did not pay
adequate attention nor did they take steps to control the situation.
The report of the ACP indicates that he had visited Mangolpuri
on the morning of 1st November. After that he only came at the time of evacuation of families
on 3.11.84. On 2nd
November, the SHO had met him at P.S. Nangloi.
DCP is stated to have had a round on 1.11.84 in the morning and
later on 3rd November in the evening along with some army
personnel. He probably
avoided this area after handing it over to the mercy of
local leaders. RECOMMENDATIONS
6.61.
SHO Inspector R.S. Dahiya was not only disinclined to take action
but also seemed to be actively involved in the attacks on Sikhs.
As a matter of fact, the police presence made only matters worse.
He did not even bother to get Firs registered.
His conduct has been extremely reprehensible.
It is recommended that disciplinary action for major penalty
be taken against him for dereliction of duty and suppressing the incidents
of crime. 6.62. The conduct of ACP and DCP will be discussed separately. SHO
: Inspector jagdish Chand Sharma(16.3.83
to 2.9.85) ACP
: Shri jagmal Singh 6.63.
Tilak Nagar Police Station was seriously affected and incidents
of arson started in this police Station at night on 31.10.84 at Jail
Road and Hari Nagar Depot. On
the 1st November, Mayapuri area went up in flames.
Incidents of arson, loot and killings continued right up to 3rd
November 1984. According
to the Delhi Administration, 63 persons were killed during the riots
in the area of this Police Station. AFFIDAVITS
FILED BEFORE THE MISRA COMMISSION 6.64.
A number of affidavits were filed before Misra Commission.
Perusal of these affidavits clearly indicates that the police
of this area was partisan and permitted the mobs to carry on their nefarious
activities unhindered. Not
only that, the police actually took action against the Sikhs trying
to defend themselves, arrested and humiliated them.
6.65.
Smt. Darshan Kaur wife of Sardar Harbans Singh (2277) has described
that on 1.11.84 at about 10 O’clock in the morning, smoke could be seen
from Mayapuri area. She
has further stated that the Hindus and Sikhs of Fateh Nagar and Shiv
Nagar decided to form resistance groups.
Her husband being an Ex-Army Personnel briefed them on how to
protect the area. They
continued to protect themselves as a consequence of which they were
safe on 1st and 2nd November 1984.
Once or twice policemen came and told them to go inside but the
locals did not agree. However, on 3.11.1984, 5-6 policemen forcibly entered their
house. Smt. Swaran Kaur
and her husband were beaten up by the police.
Then her husband was taken to the Police Station where he was
again beaten up and tortured.
The police took away her husband’s licensed gun, a case u/s 307
IPC was registered against him and whatever money was in his pocket
was removed by the policemen in the Police Station.
After being released from jail, he used to complain about pain
in his stomach. According to the deponent, her husband ultimately died on 13.6.85
on account of the injuries as a result of the beating given by the police. 6.66.
Major N.S. Phull, AMC (Retd.) (170/85) has given a vivid description
of how he was taken to Thana under orders of Shri Katna, DCP, when he
sought the police help to prevent the mob from burning and looting this
shop in this area. His
licensed pistol No. 815904 with ammunition and cash of Rs. 314/- was
seized by the police and when he asked for a receipt, he was beaten
up inside the cell, by SI Babu Lal, ASI Attar Singh, Constable Khazan
Singh, besides others, whom he could not recognize.
Later he was forcibly made to sign a receipt by Sub Inspector
Sat Pal Saini. In jail, he learnt that he along with some other Sikhs, have
been falsely implicated under various sections of the IPC vide FIR No.
442 of 1984 where he was shown to be leading other persons for looting
and plundering etc. 6.67.
Shri Kirpal Singh (136/85), Shri Inder Mohan Singh (146/85),
Sardar Mohinder Singh (2394/85) and Shri Trilochan Singh (2404) have
given similar accounts of police beating and humiliation besides implicating
them in false cases. Smt.
Kulwant Kaur Gill (182/85) gives details of violence and loss of property. 6.68.
It is interesting to note that in this Police Station not only
the residents of this area but Shri Piara Singh (2689) resident of Vikas
Puri, who went to Tilak Nagar Police Station to seek refuge in the Police
Station, was maltreated, arrested and implicated along with other Sikhs in FIR No. 442 mentioned above.
Later instead of Rs. 600/-, taken from his pocket, he was offered
only Rs. 60/- for which he complained to the DCP. 6.69.
In Tilak Nagar, since the residents –both Hindus and Sikhs –
had organized themselves into resistance groups, the mob indulging in
violence was unhappy. Later,
with the active help and connivance of the police, they continued their
nefarious activities on 3rd November and were not prevented
by the law enforcement agency. AFFIDAVITSRECEIVED
BY THE COMMITTEE 6.70.
One affidavit has been filed by major (Retd) N.S. Phull before
the Committee which is similar to the one he filed before the Misra
Commission. He has mentioned
that on his complaint vigilance enquiry was held against defaulting
officials. The police records
indicate that though he had complained against a number of police officials
yet the Police Commissioner’s Office took action against only Head Constable
Dharam Vir Singh who was censured and since SI Sat Pal had already been
dismissed on some other charges, no further action was taken against
him. No action, however, seems to have been taken against SI Babu
Lal, ASI Attar Singh and Constable Khazan Singh who beat up Major Phull.
Some other affidavits filed before the Committee also indicate
police inaction in the area. FIR'
s 6.71.
It is sad commentary on the affairs of this Police Station that
only one FIR for each day, i.e. 1st, 2nd and 3rd
November 1984 has been registered by the police. All the three FIRs are against the Sikhs Only.
The arrests were made of only of Sikhs who were tortured and
humiliated alt the Police Station. This is also strange as the DCP’s Headquarter is also in this
area and these things went on happening under his very nose. POLICE
ACTION 6.72. ----- Control the situation and allowed
the mobs to have a field day.
These mobs looted and burnt Gurudwaras and killed more than 63
Sikhs in this area. 6.73.
In his statement dated 15.1.85, the SHO had painted a rosy picture
by stating that no unto ward incident took place on31.10.84 and he allegedly
controlled a crowd by ‘mini care charge’ on 1st November, 1984.
He further stated that on 2.11.84, their were no incidents of
arson etc. and only when the Sikhs assaulted a police party in the forenoon,
he registered FIR NO. 443. He
boasted that due to intensive patrolling, hard work and prompt action,
the situation remained under control and there was no loss of life in
the area of PS Tilak Nagar. 6.74.
Why an officer of the rank of SHO told blatant lies is not understandable
because the police records show that in this police Station there was
no lathi charge, no use of tear-gas and no firing to control the situation.
No preventive arrests were made on 31.10.84, on 1st or2nd November,
1984 and the arrests made under substantive offences were and of the
miscreants but of members of Sikh Community who were trying to defend
themselves with the help of the members of the other communities of
that area. The wireless
logbook of this Police Station indicates a number of messages of killings
and deaths even on 1st November 1984 and still the SHO has the audacity
to say that no deaths occurred in his jurisdiction.
On the other hand, Delhi Administration itself after verification
has placed the figure of deaths at 63. RECOMMENDATIONS 6.75.
The police in general, and the SHO in particular, have behaved
in an extremely irresponsible manner in connivance with the culprits.
SHO and other police staff are guilty of gross misconduct for
torturing and humiliating the Sikhs whom they arrested apparently without
sufficient cause. The SHO- Inspector Jagdish Chand Sharma made no efforts to
control the situation and is certainly not fit to be retained in a disciplined
force and action for imposition of major penalty is recommended against
him. 6.76.
SI Babu Lal, ASI Attar Singh and Constable Khazan Singh deserve
to be dealt with severely and major penalty proceedings should also
be initiated against them. SHO
: Inspector Sheodeen Singh(6.7.84
to 25.2.85) ACP
: Shri Jagmal Singh 6.77.
Police Station Janakpuri has a few villages under its jurisdiction
besides urban colonies like Janakpuri, Uttam Nagar and Vikas Puri.
One Police Post At Uttam Nagar was under the charge of S.I. Iqbal
Singh. AFFIDAVITS
FILED BEFORE THE MISRA COMMISSION 6.78.
-------------- Misra Commission regarding incidents in this Police
Station. The names of some
of the important deponents were: Smt. Amrit Kaur 9101); Shri Balbir
Singh (2305); Shri R.S.Virk (2336); Smt. Swaran Kaur (2338); Shri Lakhbir
Singh (2322); Shri Mohan Singh (2335); Shri Apjeet Singh (2353); Shri
Mohinder Singh (2355); Shri Buta Singh (2356); Shri Swinder Singh (2358);
Shri Didar Singh (2359); Shri Sukhdev Singh (2360); Shri Satnam Singh
(2361); Shri Jagjit Singh (2362); Shri Harvinder Singh (2401); Major
T.S.Chhatwal (2637); Smt. Manjit Kaur (2786); and Shri Avtar Singh (2826). 6.79.
Of the above deponents, Smt. Amrit Kaur (101); Shri R.S.Virk
(2336); Shri Balbir Singh (2305); and Smt. Swaran Kaur (2338) were cross-examined
by the Misra Commission. Besides,
the Investigating Team of the Commission investigated the facts deposed
by S/Shri Jagjit Singh (2362); Sukhdev Singh (2360); Satnam Singh (2361);
Didar Singh (2359); Swinder Singh (2358) and by and large found the
incidents narrated by them to be correct. AFFIDAVITS
FILEDIN THE COMMITTEE 6.80.
A number of affidavits have also been received by the Committee.
They are of a similar nature describing the apathy of the police
and complaining that their FIRs were not recorded at the police station.
They also described the losses which they suffered. SEQUENCE
OF EVENTS 6.81.
The police records clearly indicate that when incidents of rioting
took place at Hari Nagar Bus Stop.
Two injured person’s were admitted to Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital
in the early hours of 1st November 1984.
Apparently, violent mobs active in Delhi Cantonment and Nangloi etc.
spilled over to Janakpuri area and went on a looting and burning spree.
From early morning on 1st November 1984,riots took a very serious
turn and there were incidents of arson and looting at Pankha Road and
Janakpuri in C-3 Block behind Hari Nagar Bus Depot.
Many houses, shops and business establishments besides cycles
and taxis were set on fire. Violence
spread to Navada Bus Stand, Virender Nagar, Janak Cinema and Gurudwara
in ‘C’ Block. Killing started
on 1st November 1984 and S.S. Mota Singh School was also burnt.
Incidents of violence in this Police Station continued on 2nd
and 3rd November 1984 even though extra force had been received
by 1st November 1984 itself. FIR'
s 6.82.
SHO Janakpuri has registered only one FIR attach on 31st
October, 1st November, 2nd November and 3rd November 1984.
These are of general nature and describe the incidents in this
Police Station in general. DEATHS 6.83.
The Delhi Administration on the basis of inquiry conducted has
given a figure of 36 persons having been killed. However, the figure should be on the higher side as according
to the deponents POLICE
STATION 6.84.
The police records indicate that even though trouble had started
in this Police Station on 31st October 1984 and continued
up to 3rd November 1984 yet no arrests were made on 31st
October or 1st November 1984 either for substantive offences or under
preventive sections. As
matter off act, no preventive arrests were made in this Police Station
through out the period of riots.
No use of teargas shells was made nor did the police resort to
any lathi charge, although in his statement dated 30.11.84 the SHO claims
that the mob was repulsed many times by lathi charge.
This is obviously an incorrect statement.
Some firing is alleged to have been resorted to.
However, this was obviously not effective because no one was
hurt or injured and the incidents continued up to the 3rd
of November 1984 were under section 188 IPC, more of a preventive nature
rather than for substantive offences committed.
Police firing, supposed to have been resorted to, does not appear
to be correct because the SHO at 0200 hrs on 2nd November,
1984 had sent a report on certain points including firing and he sent
a ‘nil’ report. This would
show that there could have been no firing on 1st November 1984 and the
figures of firing appear to be fabricated and therefore, no reliance
can be place on them. It
is strange that the Delhi Administration in their argument before Misra
Commission have submitted that the SHO formed the Peace Committee of
the residents of all communities and “No incident took place after the
evening of1.11.84”. This
is factually a mis-statement because the police records and log books
as well as the statements of the deponents clearly prove that incidents
of violence, looting and killing also continued on 2nd and
3rd November 1984. Why
such a misleading version was given to Misra Commission totally contrary
to facts needs to be probed. DISCUSSION
6.85.
From the statement of Smt Amrit kaur (101); Shri Mohinder Singh
(2355); Shri Didar Singh (2359); Shri Sukhdev Singh (2360); Shri Boota
Singh (2356); and Shri Jagjit Singh (2362), it is clear that thepolice
was present when incidents were taking place but refused to take effective
action. The police used
to record FIRs of the deponents, as would beear from the affidavits
of Smt. Swaran Kaur (2338); Shri Harvinder Singh (2401); Shri jagjit
Singh (2362); etc. According
to Shri R.S.Virk (2336) and Shri Sukhdev Singh (2360) the police was
actually instigating the mob to set fire to the properties of the Sikhs.
This is strange that although a number of persons in----- mob
were known to every one yet they were neither apprehended nor charge-sheeted
nor cases registered against them which clearly indicates that the will
to It was completely lacking and no serious attempt was due to contain
or effectively deal with the riots. ----The statement of Shri R.S.Virk
(2336) it is also -------- that his scooter had been stolen by one Vedu,
local bad character which was recovered through the ------ offices of
the ACP but it was actually handed over to the owner without any record
or entry at the Police Station. This would show that the general practice of recovering stolen
property without taking any action against the culprits was being followed
in this Police Station also. There
are some allegations by name against the DCP, which will be separately
discussed. (Affidavit of Shri Harvinder Singh (2401) The callous attitude
of the policies clear from the affidavits of Shri Didar Singh (2359);
Major T.S.Chhatwal, an Ex-Army Officer (2637) and many others.
Shri Didar Singh goes to the extent of stating that when he resisted
the mob by firing and the mob fled away, an ASI and a Head Constable
brought the mob back. He
has directly implicated Shri Sajjan Kumar, a local M.P. under whose
directions it is alleged the mobs were being led. RECOMMENDATIONS
6.86.
SHO Inspector Sheodeen Singh and SI Iqbal Singh, In charge of
P.P.Uttam Nagar, both failed in their duty to control the situation
in their respective areas and they did not take either direct action
or preventive action to contain the riots as result of which arson,
loot and killings continued in this Police Station for 4 days.
They also did not properly utilize the additional force that
was deputed to this area and, therefore, are accountable for dereliction
of duty and need to be suitably dealt with departmentally. SHO
: Inspector Hawa Singh Rana (8.7.83
to 6.9.85) ACP
: Shri
Jagmal Singh 6.87.
Police Station Najafgarh covers an area of more than 100 sq,
kms. Having about70 villages bordering Haryana. It also includes CRPF Group Centre in Jharoda Kalan.
There is one Police post at Kapashera. SEQUENCEOF
INCIDENTS 6.88.
There was no incident in this Police Station on 31st October,
1984 but on 1st November, 1984 there was wide-spread violence from about10
AM onwards in Gaushala, Roshanpura, Kochhar Farm, Dichaun Kala Road
kapashera Border and Gurudwara Roshanpura.
A number of trucks and shops besides factories were set a blaze.
The incidents of violence continued unabated on 2nd
November 1984 especially in Jharoda and Kapashera border. DEATHS 6.89. According to Delhi Administration, 36 persons
of this area were killed during the riots.
Citizens’ Justice Committee placed the figure at 79, but the
Delhi Police gave only a figure of 19.
Keeping in view the events of arson, looting and killing and
the fact that Delhi Administration was able to get identification done
in 36 cases, it is felt that the figure of deaths given by the Citizens’
Justice Committee may be nearer the mark.
AFFIDAVITS
RECEIVED IN MISRA COMMISSION 6.90.
Two main affidavits received in the Misra Commission in respect
of this Police Station were by Smt. Balbir Kaur (2684) ands. Raminder
Singh, an ex-Inspector of CRPF, (2677).
Besides the set two affidavits, there was a complaint filed by
M.S. Sidhu, joint Secretary of the Sikh Samaj Sudhar Sabha, New Delhi,
addressed to Shri S.S.Jog, the then Commissioner of police, requesting
for registration of a murder case against the police officers for committing
triple murder. In this
complaint Shri Sidhu has alleged that the SHO Najafgarh along with Ram
Chander, ASI, led the rioters to Farm No.2, who killed the husband,
brother and a relative of Smt. Hardeep Kaur.
Despite her repeated requests to the police, no murder case was
registered against the culprits. This complaint was enquired into by the Police Commissioner’s
Special Enquiry Cell and the number of statements recorded by the police
give an indication that the complaint was prima facie correct. 6.91.
Smt. Balbir Kaur (2684) has described
the burning of the Gurudwara at about t9.30 AM. And thereafter
the mob moved towards her residence at Farm No.2, Papravata Road, Najafgarh,
and attacked her house. She
has named some of the culprits whom she could identity in the mob.
The SHO and ASI reached the spot and the SHO went away promising
that he would send a truck to evacuate the Sikhs.
After about 2 hours, the mob came again, but the promised
truck did not turn up and the ASI and the two policemen, who
were kept on duty, also disappeared.
The mob attacked her house and killed the male members of the
family. She has named one
Ranbir who hit her husband. It is only after all this that the police vehicle came and
took them to the Police Station.
It seems that Smt. Balbir Kaur was separated from her men-folk
and while the ASI Ram Chander kept telling her that they had been sent
to the hospital, Ranbir later told her he had killed her husband while
Hukmi held on to his head so that he could strike a proper blow.
It seems clear that this family was not given proper protection
by the police. 6.92.
S. Raminder Singh
(2677), annex-Inspector CRPF, gives an equally gruesome picture of callousness
and in difference of the SHO as well as the officers of the CRPF.
Being an ex-Inspector of the CRPF, living opposite to the CRPF
Lines, Shri Raminder Singh made repeated efforts to seek help both from
the SHO Hawa Singh Rana and the CRPF officers from the Commandant Satish
Kumar Mohindroo downwards. Neither
the SHO nor the CRPF officers gave any help and this is surprising because
Raminder Singh was an ex-employee of the CRPF and well-known to them.
The CRPF officers were not even prepared to give refuge to the
three young girls of Raminder Singh.
Even when with great reluctance the CRPF came to help the families
of the Hindus and Shri Raminder Singh managed to get into the vehicle,
the crowd however still managed to kill his brother.
S.Raminder Singh’s affidavit is a sad commentary on the functioning
of the authorities whether it be the local police or the CRPF.
Apparently, the police of this police Station had no will to
act and save the life and property
of the citizens. The CRPF officers also behaved in a very shabby manner. AFFIDAVITS
FILED BEFORE THE COMMITTEE 6.93.
Three affidavits have been filed before this committee by Shri
Tarlok Singh (151/87), Shri Malkiat Singh (186/87) and Smt. Kamlesh
Kumari (187/87). They have
complained that the police did not register their FIRs, did not investigate
their cases and they suffered heavy losses. FIR'
s 6.94.
Only 3 FIRs were registered in this Police Station – two on theist
and one on2nd November, 1984- in which details in general of looting
and killing have been described.
Details of the FIRs were asunder: - (i)
FIR No. 256 U/s. 147/148/149/427/436/302/295/395 IPC was registered
on 1st November 1984. Time
10.45 AM to 7.00 PM. “
On being informed by the Wireless Operator H/C Tara Chand, a police
party comprising of 13 persons, namely, SI Omvir, SI Bal Kishan, ASI
Ram Chander, ASI Jagdish Singh H/C Raj Singh, H/C Raghu Nath, Constables
Ravi Dutt, Brijender Singh, Rajveer, Bheem Singh, DAP Arjan Singh, Manohar
Lal and Tejpal reached Gaushala Road where disturbance was reported.
The police party saw a mob of 300/400,one scooter (two wheeler)
DLS 2910 was on fire. When
the police interrupted the rioters they ran towards Chawla Stand and
started burning the shops. Two
shops were totally burnt. In
the meantime, the SHO also reached there.
On being interrupted, the mob ran towards Bijwasan Road and then
at Roshanpura set fire to Gurudwara there.
Five houses, one truck and four tractors all belonging to Sardars
were set ablaze. The mob also injured many Sardars who ran towards Dhansa Stand.
On being interrupted, the mob preceded towards Dharampura and
set on fire a thread factory belonging to a Sardar.
The mob, by that time had swelled to 1500.
Then the mob came towards Chhawala Stand, set a shop on fire
and ran towards Najafgarh and set on fire 8 shops and houses.
Then the mob proceeded towards Delhi and enrooted burnt a truck
parked on the road opposite Nangali Sakrawati.
Then the mob proceeded towards Dichau Village and set on fire
three buses there. Then
the mob entered the PHC Hospital and started beating those Sardars who
had come there for dressing and treatment of their injuries.
SI Ram Chander, with the help of staff, dispersed the mob and
after the mob had left, it was found that it had killed 8 Sardars whose
identity could not be ascertained.
They received injuries on head, face and forehead etc. Five persons
seriously injured by the mob were sent to RML Hospital in a private
truck. When it grew dark,
the mob left the scene and during the entire period, more force and
fire brigade could not come though intimation was sent many times.” (ii)
FIR No. 257 was registered on 1st November, 1984 at 10.00 PM.
(PP Kapashera u/s 147/148/149/427/436/302/201/395 IPC. “
SI Ram Kishan, H/C Sohrab Kha, DAP Jagdish Singh, Driver Devi Singh
(Police Jeep No. DEG 4502) were on patrol duty and reached Kochhar Farm,
Bijwasan Road at about 2.25PM.
The Farm had already been burnt as some anti-social elements
had set the building on fire in the forenoon but no body was injured.
When the police party reached Bijwasan railway crossing, they
found many persons burning between the railways
a mob of about 400/500 had collected there.
This mob, it is alleged, was dispersed with great difficulty. When the police party proceeded towards Kapashera, it met another
police party comprising of ASI Jagdish Prakash, Constables Balwan Singh
10555/DAP, Moti Lal 193/W, Satbir Singh 10477/DAP and Nihal Singh 10508/DAP.
They were standing near two trucks HRX 1870 and DEG 1112, both
loaded and parked
near Kapashera Village. Both
the vehicles were on
fire. A mob
of about 500/600 was standing there.
‘We dispersed the mob which went towards Kapashera border’.
In the meantime, 700/800 persons came from Tunda-hera towards
Kapashera border and the mob set on fire 13 trucks, one road roller
parked at the Gill and Sandhu Petrol Pump.
The pump was also set on fire.
The mob had also set on fire two Dhabas on the border.
In the meantime, there was firing from the roof of petrol pump.
Additional force and Fire Brigade did not came. “
SHO and ACP Transport Nagar also reached at the scene of occurrence
and the mob was dispersed. The
mob beat and burnt to death four Sardars.” (iii)
FIR No. 258 u/ss 147/148/149/427/541/380 IPC was registered at
5.35 AM. on 2nd November, 1984 on the complaint of a private
person, namely, Amir Singh S/o ShriShiv lal.
His FIR describes the incident in Kochhar Farm located on Bijwasan
Road. A mob of about 150/200 came and attacked the Kothi located inside
the Farm. The mob smashed
the glasses of the Kothi and tried to set the Kothi on fire. 6.95.
A reading of these three FIRs clearly indicates that the police
was all along with the mobs and doing precious little to come to grips
with the situation and control the riots. POLICE
ACTION 6.96.
The inactivity of the police is also clear from the fact that
no arrests were made under substantive offences from 1st to 4th
November 1984. No preventive
arrests were made on 1st November 1984.
Even on 2nd and 3rd November 1984, only 4 and 2 persons
respectively were arrested which could be considered as negligible considering
the magnitude of the violence.
Besides, their is no mention of any firing or use of tear-gas
to control the riots. 6.97.
If the affidavits of the deponents are to be believed, the police
was apparently hand in glove with the rioters. This is clear from the fact that the rioters could enter PHC
Hospital and beat the Sardars inside the Hospital. It is also clear from the FIR 256 that the Sardars were killed
right in the presence of the police officers inside the Hospital.
6.98.
In his report-dated 25.11.84, the SHO has stated that even though
the policemen were armed, the mobs were too large as compared to the
force and as such ineffective.
At another place in his report dated 29.11.84, the SHO has stated
that the arms were in sufficient to serve the purpose for maintaining
law and order. He has himself
stated that in the Malkhana he had 3 semi-automatic rifles, one Stan
gun, 36 rifles and17 pistols/revolvers.
Were all these insufficient?
This statement is totally unacceptable because the police records
show that not a single shot was fired.
Any amount of arms or ammunition would have been useless if he
will to take action was lacking. 6.99.
The SHO and ASI Ram Chander along with the rest of the staff
did not behave like
members of the disciplined force and they are guilty of dereliction
of duty. Ram Chander SI
even disappeared from the scene as per the statement of Smt. Balbir
Kaur (2684), when the mob appeared.
The conduct of Commandant S.K. Mohindroo and other officials
of the CRPF also do not come out in a good light
as they acted in a most callous and improper manner by not providing
refuge to one of their own
Ex-Inspectors whom they knew and who had served in that Unit for more
than five years. RECOMMENDATIONS
6.100.
(a) SHO Hawa Singh Rana and SI Ram Chander are certainly not
fit to be retained in the police force and departmental action for major
penalty should be initiated against them. (b)
Delhi Administration should also take up the matter about the
lapses on the part of the senior officers of the CRPF with the appropriate
authorities that their
inaction and callousness is brought to light and suitable action initiated
against them. THE
ROLE OF 6.101.
As has been indicated earlier, West District had three Sub-Divisions,
each under the control of one Assistant Commissioner of police. The role of these three officers is being discussed as under:- A)
SHRI SAJJAN SINGH, ACP, MOTI NAGAR. There
are two Police Stations under Moti Nagar Sub-Division, viz. Rajouri
Garden and Moti Nagar. The
situation in these two police Stations remained fairly under control
after additional police force was provided to these Police Stations.
There are no specific allegations against him by any of the deponents.
The overall supervision of Shri Sajjan Singh can be considered
as satisfactory. B)
SHRI JAGMAL SINGH, ACP, TILAK NAGAR. This
Sub-Division had three Police Station in its jurisdiction, viz., Najafgarh,
Janakpuri and Tilak Nagar. Although
none has made any specific allegations against Shri Jagmal Singh, the
records and incidents indicate that there was lack of supervision on
his part and there is no indication of his having come to grips with
the situation. The SHOs
in three Police Stations do not seem to have been given proper guidance.
There is also no indication of Shri Jagmal Singh, ACP , having
made any positive contribution in tackling the riots in his area or
directing the SHOs to be effective. C)
SHRI J.K. SAXENA,ACP, PUNJABIBAGH ACP
Punjabi Bagh had four Police Stations under his jurisdiction, viz.,
Sultanpuri, Mangolpuri, Nangloi and Punjabi Bagh.
The situation in these Police Station, as has been discussed
already, was very bad during the riots and there was connivance between
the police and the rioters. It
seems that the ACP lacked the will
to provide proper guidance to the SHOs which could be partly
due to the fact that the rioters had political patronage and the ACP
did not want to get involved.
He hardly visited Sultanpuri and Mangolpuri and more
or less abdicated his charge in favour of the SHOs.
He seems to have directed the SHOs to record only one FIR of
a general nature and also given them general instructions of what to
record. That
is why in this Sub Division FIRs 351, Nangloi, 511 Punjabi Bagh
and174 Mangolpuri dated 1.11.84 have, more or less ,similar wording
and content. Two of the
FIRs not only cover the past incidents but also those which followed,
which is rather strange. He
seems to have helped the SHOs in their cover up job rather than control
the situation in his Sub-Division. 6.102. It is understood that both
Shri Jamul Singh and Shri J.K. Saxena have since retired from service
and as such there appears to be no point in recommending
any specific action against them at this stage even though their
role during the riots was quite dubious.
DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER OFPOLICE –SHERI U.K. KATNA 6.103.
Shri U.K. Katna
was directly in charge
of West District during the riots.
Shri katna had given a number of reports to the Police Commissioner’s
office in connection with the riots vide his letters Nos. 14473/X(W)
dated 12.12.84, 52938-391-R (West)
dated 31.12.84 and 55/P(W) dated 4.1.85. 6.104.
After a perusal of his reports and the police records including
the log books, the picture which emerges in respect of this District
is some what strange and intriguing.
To give a few examples- (i)
At 1358 hrs on 31.10.84, a peculiar collective message was flashed
by West District Control to all Police Stations in
West District. The strange message reads as under :- “
Care should be taken while giving weapons to police officers.” (ii)
On 1.11.84 at11.00 AM, there is a message to West Control Room
that the DCP ‘is on man-pack and, therefore, he cannot make any log
entries and that messages may be recorded by the West Control Room’. From
1100 hrs to 2030 hrs, DCP (West) kept his own log book closed.
This exercise was again repeated on 2ndNovember, 1984.
The DCP again closed his log book from0900 hrs to 1730 hrs. It
s clear from there cords
and on his own admission that throughout the DCP had a driver and one
operator with him along with one SI, 4 Head Constables, 7 Constables
and half section gas. If
the Operator was with the DCP all along, why he should have closed up
his log book, does need some explanation. (iii)
Again, there is a collective call recorded in the West District
Control Room at 2315 hrs on 31.10.84 that a car No. DHB 6735 with 5/6
occupants is roaming around
doing mischief. Similarly,
at1722 hrs on 1.11.84, there is another collective call in the log book
of West District Control
that 5/6 passengers in
Car No. DEC 3940 are going around and committing arson etc. and that
a watch should be kept
on this vehicle. This
is from SHO Rajouri Garden. It
is understood that DHB 6735
is registered in the name of Prem Shanker Sharma and DEC 3940
in the name of Ram Phal Tyagi, a local leader.
However, it is strange that the police does not seem to have
made any effort to intercept these vehicle or apprehend
the culprits. (iv)
All the above entries lead to only one conclusion that DCP was
not inclined to either receive any messages or take any effective action. 6.105.
His log book also
clearly indicates that he was not issuing any effective orders
or giving any guidance to his subordinates anywhere in the District.
This ineffectiveness is further evident from and incident at
Samrat Enclave, P.S. Punjabi Bagh ( which has been dealt at some length
while dealing with that Police Station. In spite of repeated requests from the ACP and SHO Punjabi
Bagh, there was avoidable delay in sending the additional force and
DCP reached the scene of occurrence long after the incident was cover.
Thus, he avoided responsibility and left things to be handled
by the SHOs and ACPs. In
his explanation, he has stated that no casualty
took place due to firing at Rajnagar Smrat Enclave. Whereas,
on the other hand, the ACP hasrecordedthattheyfound3dead bodies on there
of top in the house at Raj Nagar Samrat Enclave besides casualties which
had occurred earlier. Even
when he arrived , no arrests
were made. It is indeed
strange that in an incident in which a number of
people were killed and injured, no FIR was recorded.
Apparently, this was done as a cover up for the police inactivity
and its inability to prevent avoidable loss of life. 6.106.
Trouble
had started in this District on31st night itself.
Unlike DCP(North), DCP (West) does not seem to have taken any
precautionary measures
to seal the borders and prevent mischief makers from entering Delhi
from Haryana. As a result,
large number of people came into this District from Haryana in buses
and trains and indulged in rioting unhindered. 6.107.
The wireless log book of the District Control Room shows a number
of messages describing the various incidents but there are no corresponding
messages in reply. A unique feature in respect of this District was that the DCP
though stated to be on the move, closed down his log book.
This indicates complete abduction of authority and he left matters
entirely in the hands of subordinates who were acting in a partisan
manner. 6.108.
Even accepting his
own movement chart, DCP has mentioned that on 1.11.84 he went out patrolling in the areas of P.S. Sultanpuri and P.S. Mangolpuri followed
by P.S. Tilak Nagar at 0950 hrs from where
he left for Bhagwan
Dass Nagar via Najafgarh at 1100 hrs. It is note-worthy that the places
he visited in the morning of 1.11.84 were the same places where law
and order broke down and where local leaders were reported to have made
inflammatory speeches and urged
non-Sikhs to attack the Sikhs. 6.109.
DCP has shown that
he was moving around with one Sub Inspector, four head Constables and
seven Constables and half section
gas. With this force available with him all the time, one would
have expected him to take come effective action at least at some of
the places during his visit. However,
there is no indication of any concrete action being taken by the DCP
by way of firing and use of tear-gas
to disperse crowds or arrest of any nature preventive or under
registered cases. This indicates that either the movement chart which was given by him is not correct or that he was
moving around for the sake of formality rather than for taking effective
action to maintain law and order in his District. 6.110.
There are some specific allegations against him in some affidavits.
Major N.S.Phull 9170) has in his affidavit described how he was
taken by the DCP to the Police Station where he was beaten up and tortured
besides being involved
in a false case. This affidavit has already been discussed in detail
under P.S. Tilak Nagar. Similarly,
Shri Harvinder Singh (2401) has also described in his affidavit how
he was running away from the crowds and sought
the help of the DCP who allegedly stated : ‘What can we do ?
The dead bodies of Hindus filled in the
trains are 6.111.
The role of DCP in the District has to be judged by the overall
supervision which he exercised over the Police Stations.
Unfortunately, the facts as they emerge from the police records
and affidavits clearly indicate that trouble had started in this District
on 31st October, 1984but the police failed to rise to the
occasion. No preventive
arrests were made on 31st
October, 1984 or even on 1st November, 1984 when riots were in
full swing and crowds were
roaming around indulging in arson, loot and killings.
No arrests were made in Nangloi, Punjabi Bagh, Sultanpuri, Mangolpuri,
Janakpuri and Tilak Nagar even on the 2nd of
November, 1984. 6.112.
One would have expected some arrests in the cases registered
in specific cases of arson, loot and killings in the presence of the
police. However, one finds that no arrests were made in specific cases
in any police station on the31st October.
On 1st November, 1984 also except for 11 people arrested in Tilak
Nagar no arrests were made in any other Police Station. Arrests in Tilak Nagar also were only of Sikhs who were trying
to defend their lives and property.
On 2nd, 3rd and 4th November,
1984 also no arrests were made in Najafgarh, Nangloi, Punjabi Bagh,
Sultanpuri and Mangolpuri. No
tear-gas was used except for Samrat Enclave in PS Punjabi Bagh
where a Sikh family had opened fire.
In fact, the crowds were allowed to roam around more or less
unhindered under the guidance of the local leaders.
Similarly , except for one or two lathi charges in PS Nangloi do not give any indication of lathi charge having been resorted
to, to control the riots. The
statements made by the police officers that they resorted to lathi charge
are not substantiated by the DDs.
Further, it is difficult to place reliance in the figures regarding
the number of rounds fired by the police to control the riots
as the deponents state that the police was firing at the victims
rather than those who were
committing the crime. In
any case, the police on their own admission did not resort to any firing
in Police Stations Najafgarh
and Tilak Nagar throughout the
period of the riots even though so much trouble took place in these
Police Stations. From these
figures police action can be considered
to be negligible considering the magnitude of the riots in this District. 6.113.
It is, therefore, not at
all surprising that Sikh residents of this
area ran away to Alwar in Rajasthan and were not prepared to
return because they felt that they were not going to get any protection
from the Administration.
The inquiry report of the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi dated
17.12.84 shows the extent of break-down of law and order in this District
and the fear of this community because of the attitude of the police.
Shri Ahal Singh, a retired officer of the IRSE had also given
an affidavit (2770) which
has been discussed while dealing with P.S. Mangolpuri.
His version is also in consonance with the fading of the Deputy
Commissioner who visited Alwar.
Shri Ahal Singh while holding the riot victims ---------------------------------------- approached the Police Commissioner in an effort to make the senior officers realize the gravity
of the situation but he did not succeed. 6.114.
One can say without hesitation that the overall performance of
the DCP was extremely poor and there appears to be no doubt whatsoever
that he was unable to exercise any control over the force.
He made no efforts whatsoever to implement
section 144 which
was promulgated on 31st October, 1984 itself or the curfew
which was imposed subsequently.
Additional force of two companies from the DAP was made available
to him on 1.11.84. This
also does not seem to have been properly utilized.
In any case , no force was sent to
Sultanpuri, Najafgarh and Nangloi which were among the worst-affected
areas. The plea of inadequate
force does not hold water since the existing force and the additional
force made available was not properly utilized.
No amount of force
would have been able to control the riots in this District since the
will to act on the part of the law-enforcing agency was non-existent. RECOMMENDATION 6.115. Shri U.K. Katna, DCP, failed miserably to rise to the occasion and is unfit to head a District. Departmental action for imposing major penalty should be initiated against him. |
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