C H A P T E R – 1 2
A
G E N E R A L C O N C L U S I O N S
12.1.
In a nut shell it is
absolutely clear that the Delhi Police was caught napping
and completely unprepared to meet the crisis situation with which
they were faced consequent
to the assassination of the former Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi. Indications of trouble
in the city started in the afternoon of 31st October,
1984 right in front of the AIIMS. But the senior police officers could
not gear up the machinery to meet the challenge and take due precautionary
measures. They did not round
up the bad characters and
the situation was allowed to drift resulting in the unprecedented riots
of 1984.
12.2.
Not only was there lack of leadership but also non-implementation
of even the piece-meal orders which were issued by the senior officers.
Orders under section 144 Cr. P.C. were promulgated in certain areas
followed by curfew. But neither
were implemented by the police at local level.
Some of the policemen even
indicated that these instructions
were only for the Sikhs and
not for others. This would
explain why the implementation of the prohibitory orders was tardy in
many places and partisan in others.
12.3.
Instructions were issued to safeguard
sensitive places and seal the borders so that the miscreants from
outside Delhi should not enter the city.
These orders were also not implemented resulting in mobs from outside
Delhi entering the city and taking advantage of the turbulent atmosphere
along with the local crowds.
12.4.
The police also miserably failed to make immediate
preventive arrests and take other precautionary measures as a result of
which the miscreants had a field day.
They roamed around freely
for several days without any fear, indulging in arson, loot and killings.
At many places, these mobs were led by local leaders who supplied the mobs with inflammable materials like
kerosene, petrol, etc. to indulge in their nefarious activities, unchecked
by the law enforcement machinery.
12.5.
Not only did the police not make preventive arrests, they also
did not control the mobs by bursting
tear gas shells or resorting to lathi charge in the early stages
of the riots. They also did not resort of effective firing.
In most places, the firing was done in the ‘air’ giving the mobs
the impression that the police was not going to interfere with their unholy activities.
12.6.
One usual complaint
of the police is that the public
does not cooperate with them.
However, we find that during
the 1984 riots a large number of citizens, both men and women,
came forward and informed the police of the nefarious activities of the
mobs but they were shocked and surprised to see the indifferent and partisan
attitude of the police. It almost appeared as if the police was siding with the mobs,
which it did openly in some places, rather than taken the information
of these independent public minded citizens seriously.
As Dr. Sushila Nayar rightly laments in her letter to the Union
Home Minister (ref. To in Chapter VII page 267)
“
This poison in the police is dangerous for our country.”
12.7.
The Police Commissioner not only failed to make a correct assessment
of the situation which resulted in delay in calling in the army but there
was also subsequent lack of co-ordination at various levels.
The DAP contingents were sent to places without senior officers
commanding their men and without proper briefing
as a result of which they had no clear concept of what was expected
from them. Some even returned
to Lines on the pretext that crowds were not letting them proceed to their
destination. The local police
in many places did not properly guide the army personnel and this resulted in arson, loot
and killings continuing even after the army had been called in belatedly.
Trouble therefore did not subside as quickly as it should have
after the mobilization of the DAP, Central Forces, and, the army.
12.8.
The intelligence system of the Commissioner of Police seemed to have totally failed him.
It gave the C.P. no advance warning of what was brewing.
It also does not seem to have kept him informed when lower functionaries
were misbehaving, taking sides
with the mobs, and, allowing
the situation completely
to go
out of hand. Having
worked in the IB for a number of years one would have expected Commissioner
of Police to gear up this agency in the Capital during his tenure. But sadly this was not to be.
This resulted in the killing of thousands of innocent people in
a most gruesome and horrifying manner besides arson and looting on an
unprecedented scale, to hide which the cases were not registered by the
local police.
12.9.
A unique and novel method was evolved by the police to make recoveries
of looted property. They
announced that those who had stolen property should unload it in front
of the places from where they had stolen it or in
front of the police stations otherwise they would betaken to task.
This resulted in general amnesty and the miscreants going scot
free. It was obviously not
possible to link the
crime with the offenders by
following this method. This
procedure of giving general amnesty to all the offenders also made subsequent
investigation well-nigh impossible.
12.10.
While Addl. Commissioner of Police Shri Gautam Kaul gave instructions
to his staff to register as many cases as possible and set up special
investigation teams, Shri H.C.Jatav, Addl. C.P.
gave exactly the opposite
orders and even justified the lumping together of cases into one FIR.
Shri Kaul’s orders were surprisingly ignored by the local functionaries
and this resulted in a large number of cases not being
registered or investigated.
However, in respect of this aspect, the Government has set up a
Committee and they will be submitting
their findings separately.
12.11.
The police made concerted efforts to play down the number of killings
which occurred during the 1984 riots.
There is evidence on record to prove that the police had quietly
collected and disposed of
the bodies of those whom the mobs were unable to completely burn.
The police went on claiming that only a few hundred people had
died when the figure ran into thousands as was subsequently
proved by Ahuja Committee, after due verification.
12.12.
The extent of indiscipline in the police is also evident from the
fact that even those culprits who were caught
red-handed by Shri Gautam Kaul, the then Addl. C.P. were let off
by his subordinates once his back was turned, in spite of his specific
orders. In another case, an Inspector
refused to take arrested persons to the Thana on orders from senior
officers saying he had other work to do and strangely he is supported
by Shri Jatav, Addl. C.P. instead of being taken to task and punished.
This is not surprising because in Subzi Mandi Sri Jatav himself
let off the miscreants caught by the public.
12.13.
Rumors like water having been poisoned, and, train-load of dead
bodies of Hindus having arrived
from Punjab at the railway stations were allowed to float in the entire
city. What is surprising is that information that the water had been
poisoned appears to have started from the PCR and continued to spread
for quite some time in the city.
Such an announcement by the police officially naturally created
panic. The rumor was so wide-spread
that there is a message from the Prime Minister’s residence
asking whether any one had died as a result of drinking this water.
Instead of flashing such information over the wireless and making
public announcements, the
normal action of the administration should have been to
immediately verify from the Municipal Commissioner whether there
was any truth in this report. After
verification, they should have
stoutly denied this rumour and rounded up people spreading the
same. Instead of this, the
rumor was allowed to float for over 24 hours.
The result can well be imagined.
Similar is the case about
the rumor that train
loads of dead bodies had
arrived at railway stations
from Punjab, which were found
to be completely incorrect.
As a matter of fact, the dead bodies which did arrive were those
of Sikh Victims who had been
killed by the mobs at Tughlakabad, Nizamuddin, Palam at Railway Stations
and in the trains.
12.14.
There seem to be no
clear curt orders about firing and when it is to be resorted to by the
police. We find that most
of the police firing was done in the ‘air’ and this
certainly did not
deter the mobs from carrying on their nefarious activities in most
places. Shooting is resorted
to as a last measure to control an ugly situation.
If it is not to be effective, then
there is no sense in resorting to it and
only indicates a lack of will to deal with the situation firmly.
It is understood that the
police had
a proposal to have special rubber bullets
which would injure and Immobilize
a person but not kill, to deal with riot situations.
This proposal should be followed up so that in such situations
miscreants can be handled effectively and swiftly without too many casualties. This will also encourage lower functionaries who may not
resort, to firing for fear of subsequent enquiries, to act more
promptly and
decisively.
12.15.
It was quite apparent that specific instructions of ‘shoot at sight’
issued from the office of the
Commissioner of Police to
curb riots were completely
ignored by the lower functionaries, both at the middle as well as at the
SHO levels, who permitted mobs to carry on their
activities unchecked. Unless,
therefore, strict discipline is restored, the police in the Capital of
the country will not be able to deal with any grave situation of crisis
even in future.
12.16.
We find that some of
the senior officers manipulated their wireless log books to cover up their
tracks and others did not record the messages
which were flowing in from time to time.
This was done obviously in a bid to escape responsibility and charges
of dereliction of duty and
accountability. Apparently
the subordinate staff at various levels does not look up to the Police
Commissioner of Delhi as the real Head of
the organization. They feel
that they have support in other centers of power and therefore they can
escape the consequences of
their misdeeds and even ignore the police head.
This situation developed in Delhi because of the fact that the
majority of the police staff remains in Delhi throughout their life and
cannot be transferred
out. They just float around
from one job to the other
in Delhi and develop links with various centers of power.
This erodes discipline and the Commissioner of Police finds himself
somewhat helpless and unable to enforce discipline.
12.17.
Earlier at least senior officers could be transferred out of Delhi
to other Union Territories but over a period of time most of the UTs have
been converted into States. Thus the situation is getting more and more acute and can be compared to what happens when there is in-breeding
in any community. Government
should give serious thought to this aspect and ensure that a much
larger number of officers down to the level of SHO are brought to Delhi
on deputation from other States.
This might help in bringing about more impartiality and objectivity
in the functioning of the
Police Administration. This is necessary in Delhi which is the Capital of the Country
and the law and order machinery here has to be exemplary, efficient, disciplined
and responsive to any situation
which may arise. It might be possible to achieve this over a period of
time if recruitment to the Delhi Police is reduced and more and more efficient staff is brought on
deputation from other States. This
would ensure that the officers of proven merit are inducted into the police
force of Delhi who do not have local links. This, in turn, would ensure
more objectivity and impartiality
in their functioning as their career prospects will not depend on the
local centers of power.
12.18.
The training of the functionaries at various levels also needs
to be given a second look and geared up to meet the present requirements
of the metropolis where ripples
of national and international events first become visible .
This also applies to the intelligence
units which were not found active and did not anticipate the trouble
and give proper intelligence reports to the Police Commissioner, as per
his own statement.
12.19.
Besides proper training, the Delhi Administration
should organize ’mock’ exercises jointly with the army
so as to judge from
time to time how alert and prepared the police is to meet various situation
which can be envisaged in times of war,
civil disturbances and communal
riots etc. This should become
a regular feature and it may pay rich dividends in future.
12.20.
In a place like Delhi, the need for
having active Mohalla
Peace Committees which should represent all sections of the society, cannot
be over-emphasized. These
committee should hold meetings from time to time and be actively associated
with the law and order situation in their respective areas.
They should also be associated with ‘mock’ exercises which should
be carried out from time to time as has been suggested earlier
so that the general preparedness of law
and order machinery as well as
the activeness of the Mohalla Peace Committees can be reviewed
from time to time. This might
go a long way in ensuring the general preparedness of the administration
and the people to meet any
crisis situation.
12.21.
Planned and effective use should be made of Home Guards, NCC retired
army personnel, organisedsocial organizations and voluntary agencies to
assist the civil administration during times of
crisis. This is being stressed because then only public support will
be forthcoming in a larger measure as there will be a feeling of involvement
on their part, which is usually
lacking.
12.22.
In the existing Police
Commissioner system of Delhi the link between
the Police Commissioner and the other wings of civil administration is only the L.G.
In the States, where Police Commissioner system is in
existence, the co-ordination is done by D.G.
Police the State Home
Secretary, Chief Secretary , Home Minister
and the Chief Minister. Such
linkages provide the necessary co-ordination with other wings of Administration
which are, by and large, absent in Union Territory of Delhi.
It is, therefore, necessary that in a place like Delhi the Chief
Secretary and the Deputy Commissioner should in some form be associated
with the law and order machinery so that the lack of co-ordination which
was witnessed in 1984 November Riots is not repeated. In a crisis situation all wings of the Administration have
to work in a coordinated manner
and the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration, and the Deputy Commissioner
, therefore, need to be associated to bridge this gap. This aspect has also been highlighted in the evidence of Shri
K.S. Sethi dated 23.4.86
before the Misra Commission. Without
this bridge, the Police Administration becomes withdrawn and exclusive.
This aspect of coordination is a felt need
and needs to be seriously considered.
12.23.
While examining the role of the
Delhi Armed Police in Chapter X,
it has become evident that there is an urgent need to restructure
the entire Delhi Armed Police so
that the force becomes effective and
efficient. The shortcomings
which became evident during the riots should be effectively removed.
The capital of the country certainly deserves a better deal.
The existing instrument in the form of Delhi Police and the Delhi
Armed Police miserably failed to deliver the goods
during the November, 1984 riots.
As was revealed during the riots, the police which was accountable
for its performance to the people of Delhi failed on this account.
Their actions should have conformed to the law
of the land but they did not.
Finally, the police functionaries who were accountable for their
performance to the Organization and the Union of India also failed on
this account. The police
organization must remain at a high pitch of efficiency
to enforce the law impartially.
Over-hauling the
entire policing system
of the Capital is, therefore, a crying need and does not brook further delay.
It is, therefore, recommended that a small Expert Committee should
work out the modalities of re-organizing both the Delhi Police and the
Delhi Armed Police so that it can better serve the purpose for
which it exists.
12.24.
In the end, it is recommended that in case action is initiated
against delinquent officers,
it should be by an outside agency. Departmental enquiries by officers
of Delhi Police are not likely to
yield any results.
The Commissioner for Departmental
Enquiry under the Central Vigilance Commission could be one
such agency. The annexure
to this report and the District/Police Station-wise folders prepared during the course of enquiry contain
the bulk of the relevant material required for the purpose of such
enquiries. Most of the original
police records and the statements of the concerned officers are also readily
available for verification.
These will be found useful
for taking suitable action without any further delay.
12.25.
I would like to place on record my appreciation for the assistance
rendered by S/Shri C.M.Sharma Inspector
General of Police and I.S.
Vohra, Supdt. Of Police and the other technical staff in analyzing
the police records and the evidence for the preparation of this
Report. I would also like
to place on record my appreciation of the services of Shri S.L.Chopra,
who functioned as Secretary
to the Committee, and the other secretarial staff for organizing the office of the Committee in an efficient manner.
NEW
DELHI
August, 1988.
(MS.
KUSUM LATA MITTAL)
MEMBER
