K A N P U R

C H A P T E R   -   9

I N C I D E N T S   A T   K A N P U R

There  is  a  distinction in  the  reference  to  the  Commission  so  far  as  the  events  of  Delhi  and  events  of Kanpur and  Bokaro  are  concerned. In  regard  to  Delhi  the  incidents  are  said  to  be  “ organized  violence” whereas  in regard  to  Kanpur  and  Bokaro -  Chas   what happened  during  the  riots  has  been described  as“disturbances”.  While  all  disturbances  may not  be riots, all  riots would  usually  include disturbances.  What happened  during  October / November 1984  at Kanpur  and  Bokaro-Chas  is  certainly  riot.  All  incidents  at Kanpur  and  Bokaro-Chas  were  confined  to 31st  October  and  1st  November.  The  allegation  of  organised  violence  as such    is  not  there  in regard  to  the  incidents  at  Bokaro-Chas  though  so far  as  the incidents  at Kanpur  are  concerned, such  an  allegation  has been  raised.  The  Commission  is  bound  by the  terms of  reference.  It   would  not  be open  to  it  to find out whether  the disturbances  riots  at Kanpur  and  Bokaro-Chas  were also  organised. In terms  of  the reference  the  question  whether  the violence  at Kanpur  was  organised,  however, would  not fall  for  examination.

On  behalf  of  the State  of  Uttar  Pardesh  it  has  been  contended  that  the  terms  of  reference  do  not  require  the  Commission  to  report  about  the  lapse,  if  any,  cxommitted  by  any  particular  officer  though  the  extent  of the  damage  may  be  a  relevant  aspect  for  consideration. The  Commission  is  inclied  to  hold that  it has jurisdiction  to  act  under  section  8B  of  the  Commission of Inquiry  Act  even    within  the  frame  of  the  reference  as  it stands.  However, whether  such  action  should  be  taken  is  another  matter when the  Commission  issued   notification  calling  for  affidavits  from  persons  in the  known  of  events  relating  to  the  October /  November  1984  riots,  it  was  open  to  officers  in  the  Kanpur  District  Administration  or  even  the  U. P.  State  Administration  to  file  affidavits  disclosing  the facts.  No  affidavits  were,  however, filed. In  all  675  affidavits  were  received  out  of  which  four  were  rejected  being  out of time or  being  in regard to events  outside the  Kanpur  city  limits.

Several  groups  asked  for  leave  of the  Commission  to  be  represented  and  as  already  mentioned  in a different  part  of  the  Report,  permission  was  accorded.  The State  Governmnet  did  not  disclose  any posititve  stand  and  stated  that the  Government  would  only deny  any  allegations  implicating  the  officers  in  any  manner  in the riots.  It  also  stated  that  the State Administration  would  contend  that all that  was  legitimately  within  its power  and  could  be done  had  been  done  to contain  the  riots  and bring  about  normalcy.  That  is  why  normal  situation  was  restored  within  a  brief  period of  24  hours  and  by  the  evening of  November, 1,  1984, nomally  prevailed  again in  Kanpur.ts  were examined  by  the  Commission  --mostly at  the  instance  of  the victims  and  a  few  at  the instance of  non-Sikhs  groups.

There    is  no  dispute  that  127 Sikhs  and  8  non-Sikhs  died at  Kanour  during  the  riots.  And  all these  deaths  were between  the  night  of  31st  October  and  late  at  night  of  1st  November.  Thoush  there  was  an allegation  of  a  killking  on 2nd  Nobvember, it has  been verified  and  the incidnt  appears  to  have  taken place  during  the  night  of  1st  November.  The first  incident  as appears  from  the  police  log  book  is  around   2.30  p.m.  on 31st  October.  As  in Delhi,  the intitial  occurences  were of  spontaneous  type  reaction  of the people  at  large  against  Sikhs  as  a  whole  on  the  basis  that  two  of  their  comunity  had  injured  Smt. Gandhi  by   bullets.  Information  of  the  Prime  Minister  having  been  injured  seems  to  have  reached  Kanpur  and  become  fairly  known  by  11  in the  morning.  From the  afternoon as a  result of   reaction  to that situation incidents  started  taking place.  It is  a fact  that  by  evening  time  the  incidents  had spread  into  different  parts  of  the  city and  incoming  reports  thereof  had  become  very  frequent.  From the evening of  31st  October  cases of arson  became  quite  common.  The  attack  as  in  Delhi  was ------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- rioting  had started  in the previous  night, viz . ,  31st  October  and  there  is no  acceptable   evidence  to  hold  that  meetings  had also  been  held  and  call  had been given  before the  evening  of  31st  October  for  taking  revenge.  Information  of  Smt.  Gandhi’s passing  away  was first  widly  circulated  at  Kanpur  through  the  news  media  of  All  India  Radio  by evning  time.  It is  this news  that brought  about  a transformation in the  modality  of  the  attacks.  Unitl  that  time  the  nature  of  assault  or  action  taken  against the  Sikhs  wasn not  a  serious  type  but once  the  Prime  Minister   was  announced  to  have  succumbed  to  her  injuries,  the  nature of  attack  both  on  property  and person  changed.  Hunderds  of vehicles  were burnt, Sikh  employees  returning   from Government  offices  or industrial  units  after  duty  shifts  were  assaulted  and  badly  beaten  up.  During  the  night, apart from the  Gurudwaras, private  houses were also  looted  and burnt  and physical  assault  of  a grave  type startd.  It is  a  fact -  and  ample  evidence  was  placed   before the  Commission  that the  composition  of  the  mobs  and  the  manner  of attack  and  behaviour  of  the  crowds  were  almost of  the  same  type  as  in Delhi. Kanpur is  a  city  with  a  population  of about  30  lakhs. It is  the biggest  city  of  U.P.  and  is  very much  industrialised.  A  considerable  part  of  its  population  is of  the industrial  labour  class  and there  has  been  pressure  on  accomodation.  A lot of  jhuggis  and  jhopris  hav  come up  where  the people  belonging to the economically  backward  class  reside and  these  are spread  over in many parts of the city.

There is material that initially hoodlums and small groups, each consisting of 40 to 50 people, started pressuring Sikh shop owners and office keepers to close down their establishements. Where they yielded there was not much of scope for touble. Where, however ,there was any resistance, physical force was appleid to enforce closure. Towards evening the  ratio of hoodlums in the mobs dwindled and residents  from  jhuggis  and  jhopris  joined. Smt. Gandhi’s  death  was not  mourned  on party basis . Every Indian, including most of the Sikhs, were genuinely sorry for what happened. Some people in the Congress Party at the lower level as in Delhi either genuinely felt more  hurt and aggrieved than others or for reasons best knowm to them, wanted an exibition of that type of reaction.Such people did join the riotous mobs. There is allegation that at some places they even led them.Though the Commisson is not called upon to examine the question of organised violence, as already mentioned,there is an allegation on behalf of the victims in regard to it and the Commission would like to regard its findings on this score in regards to incidents at Delhi and hold that neither the party nor any perticular party man holding  public office had organised or helped the rioters. It is, however, a fact as disclosed in evidence that several of the party men at the loose end had participated in the riots. For the reasons indicated while dealing with this aspect in regard to the Delhi riots the Commission is of the view that criminal overt acts or abetment commited by them would be available to be tried as criminal charges and since the Commission recommended and the State of U.P. has already set up a Committee for reviewing prosecutions, the Commission would  not make any positive statement about those people who have participated in the riots.That would be a matter for the Court to determine and the Commission has no intention to prejudice the trial.

As already stated 127 Sikhs lost their lives during the riots. At one stage the victims claimed taht the number of persons who died was more and the Commission asked them to substantiate their claim but no evidence has come.During the oral submissions made on behalf of the Kanpru Riots Inquiry Co-ordination Committee the number disclosed by the State Government was not seriously disputed. From the disclosure made by the Railway Administration some deaths in trains were noticed. But as it appears, such deaths were not within the Kanpur city jurisdiction. The Commission has , therefore, no option but to procede on the footing that the total deaths of the Sikhs during the October/November 1984 riots at Kanpur were 127.

Kanpur city has 31 police stations and 94 police outposts. Orinarily, every police station has a Station Hopse Officer/Station Officer, 4-5 Sub-Inspectors, around 3 Head Constables and 20-25 Constables.Some police stations are treated as big ones where ordinarily 15-20 rifles or muskets are provided.  Of  thereon any  given  time  1/3  are on  duty  on  the  buses  that  during  a day  anyone  is  expected  to  work  for  8  hours.  It  is  the  case of  the  State  of  U.P. that  Smt. Gandhi was  due  to  visit  Allahabad on  2nd November,  1984,  and  for  providing  security  during  the  Prime  Ministers  visit  to  Allahabad-------------   officers  with  their  men had  been  deputed  there -------------------------------- from  29th  October----------------------of  a workman. A large police force including PAC contingents had been deployed to maintain law and order  in that area. Of  the remaining police force only 1/3 was available to answer the call of duty. It is contended that ordinarily the regular police force was in position to contain any situation taht arose but a very unprecedented and difficult-to-comprehend situation developed at Kanpur and against the mobilsed force of the people, particularly the trouble makers, the small number of police-men did not appear to be adequate.

In Kanpur the following areas have Sikh concentration: Govindnagar, Kidwainagar, Gumti No.5,Ratanlal Nagar, Ranjit Nagar, Pandu Nagar, P-Road, Rajinder Nagar and Daboli. According to the District Administration, since these areas have Sikh concentration and riot in these areas involved great risk, police had instructed to keep an eye on these areas. In the absence of adequate police force it did not become possible to provide protection in small pocket. The District Administration contnded that in this background the riots were more frequent in small pockets,the incedents were many and these were mostly in these areas.Factually this position is not correct.Gumti No. 5 is one of the most affected areas. Similarly, there are some more areas out of the places named above where a lot of incidents took place.

The  victims  have  accepted  the  position  that  the  riotous  situation  continued  for  about  36  hours  at  Kanpur  ,  being  from  the  evening  of  31st  october  till  the  morning  of  2nd  November.  The  incidents  as  claimed  by  the  victims  during  these  36  hours  are   not    at  all  disputed  by  the State  Government  of  the  Kapur  District  Administration,  except  in regard  to  allegations  of  rape  and  certain  other  minor aspects.  According  the  counsel  for  the  riot  victims, on account of  appropriate  and  timely  preventive  steps  having  been taken ,  no  widespread  disturbances  took places in  cities  like  Allahabad, Agra, Varanasi,  Gorakhpur, Meerut  and Bareilly  located  in  the state  of  Utar Pardesh.  Counsel  for  the State  has  disputed  this  posiition   as also  the  comparative  basis. It  was  contended   before  the  Commission  that the  cities  referred  to  above  were  of  about  1/5 size  of  Kanpur.  The Sikh  population  living  in  these  cities  was  small, while  at  Kanpur their  number  was  aboout  1.5  lakhs,  in each  of  these cities  it  did  not  exceed  15,000  to  20,000 at  the  most.  None  of  these cities  is  as  industrialised  as Kanpur. Nor  are  these  cities  as  sprad  out  as  Kanpur. Kanpur  City  is  a  full  district  and  Kanpur  Dehat  is another  independent  district  consisting  of  the  rural  areas but  its  administrative  headquarters  is still  located  within   the  city  of  Kanpur.  It is  a  fact  that  not  much  of   riotous situation  developed within the  Dehat  District. It is  also  a  fact  that  in all  these citites as  also  in Kanpur Dehat  area  there has  been  some  sort of  trouble during  the period  though the  disturbances  were  not  as  widespread as  at  Kanpur.  The Commission  is  of  the view  that  the  stand  taken by  the  Government of  Uttar  Pardesh  is  correct  and merely  on  a comparative basis  of  the  situation  arising in these  towns  and Kanpur  a conclusion  would  not  follow  that  the  riotous  situation  at Kanpur  was  on  account of  negligence  and incompetence  as  also  deliberate anti-Sikh  stance  of  the  district  administration of  Kanpur.

According  to the Government records made available in the answer to the interrogateries, it appears that the Home Secretary of the State Government altered the dictrict administration in the morning os 31st October against possibility of untoward situations developing on account of Smt. Gandhi having been injured by security gaurd’s bullets. Around 11a.m. on 31st October the Distrist Magistrate , the Senior Supdt. Of Police, Supdt. Of Police, City, and the Addl. District Magistrate met to chalk out steps to be taken to meet the situation that might arise. They decided to impose prohibitory orders under S. 144, Cr. P.C. immediately but in their opinion reference to Smt. Gandhi’s condition as a ground for imposition of prohibitory orders did not look appropriate. Therefore, the prohibitory order was grounded upon the labour trouble which was already existing for the last two days in the industrial area of the city. These officers along with the police officers and some other Government officers again met at 2 p.m. at Kotwali to review the situation. It was decided to alert the police again and the police were asked to keen a close eye on the situation and have intensive patrolling. Acording to the District Administration, the District Magistrate kept on moving from place to place throughout the night of 31st October in order to ensure that the situation got and remained contained. They held a meeting again at 4 a.m. and an assesment of the situation was made which indicated that the situation had improved. While the holding of the meetings has not been denied on behalf of the victims it has been contended that the situation had not improved at all during the night of 31st October. Between midnight and morning there were 24 cases of arson and between 6 and 10:30 in the morning of 1st November there were as many as 164 cases of arson. These figures have been taken from the records of the Fire Brigade establishment of the State Government and are not in dispute. The Commission accepts the stand of the victims that there were no abatement of the riotous activity during the night of 31st October. It is also quite possible, and the Commission is prepared to accept,that apart from the 188 incidents of arson till 10:30 a.m. of 1st November, there could have been several other small incidents where the Fire Brigare authorities might not have been contacted. A tense situation had developed; security both of person and property had come to be in a state of jeopardy and contacting the Fire Brigade and waiting for its response may not have been possible in every case.

The genuinenessf the entries in the Log Book which has been produced from the police control room was challnged on behalf of the victims. The Commission had to refer to several entries in the Log Book. There is an official presumtion of correctness attached to such entries. The manner in which entries have been made in the Log Book and the contents thereof when cross-checked with refence to entries in other documents, lend support to the genuineness of the entries in the Log Book. There is no clear material on the basis of which the Commission can dislodge the presumption of correctness and hold that spurious entries have been made in the Log Book.

Curfew had not been imposed in the city till the morning of 1st November. Notwithstanding the imposition of prohibitory orders under  S. 144,Cr. P. C.,  the riotous mobs freely moved during the afternoon, evening as also night of 31st October. The imposition of curfew in the morning brought not much of impact on the situation. Prohibitory orders under S. 144, Cr. P.C. Or curfew cam be effective only when enforced. The Commission is satisfied on the basis of the evidence that neither the prohibitory orders under S. 144, Cr. P. C., nor curfew was strictly enforced and, therefore, neither of these worked as an impediment against the riots. The Commission has noticed the fact that some prosecutions are pending involving charge under S. 188, I.P.C. for violating the prohibitory orders. They are a few and are perhaps related to certain areas where the police did attemt to enforce these orders.

The plea of inadequacy of the strength of the police advanced by the State during the inquiry and particularly while cross-examining the deponents on the side of the victims perhaps is not wholly wrong. It is a fact that quite a sizable part of the police force had gone to Allahabad and  till almost noon time of 31st October some local police as also the PAC contingents were keeping guard in the Factory Area. It is the case of the District Admnistration taht when it was alerted by the State Home Seceratary in the morning of 31st October, they brought about a settlement of the labour dispute, withdrew the police and the PAC contingent from the factory area for deployment within the city to meet the apprehended situation. Conceding that the police force available in the city area was inadequate and the requisition for additional force had not been asnwered until late at night on 31st October, attempt should have been made for calling the Army on the 31st itself and there was no neccesity to wait till  9 a.m. of 1st November. The Commission has examined Brig. R. K. Kohli who was Station Commander at Kanpur at the relevnt time.He has stated taht on 31st October the availability of officers and men at Kanpur was: 65 officers, 159 JCOs ans 2366 other ranks. He recieved the written request from the Distt. Magistrate at 9:35 a. m  on 1st November 1984 and the Army moved into the city by 11 a. m. In fact, the very first column had moved within 10 minutes of the request and in the course of every half an hour one after the other new columns moved in. By afternoon of 1st November, 7 columns were in the city. By evening another column was sent. If without waiting till the morning of  1st November the assistance of Army had been asked for during the previous day at least for patrolling in the city, that would have been a great deterrent against the build-up of th riots. As Brig. Kohli  has said, the Army initially undertook flag march and patrolling duty but as they were not used to every part of the city and required magistrates to issue appropriate requisitions, in the absence of either proper guidance or magistrates, their functionaing was impeded. The Commission, therefore, is of the opinion that in case the Army had been called on 31st October, the situation would not have deteriorated and possibly the incidents that took place in the night of 31st October or on 1st November would not have happened. The District Magistrate made a wrong assessment of the situation by feeling satisfied that with the incidents taking place in the afternoon, evening and night of 31st October, the situation had eased and nothing more untoward would happen. Obviously the factual position was either ignored or not taken into  accouont. There was no abatement of the riots. It may be that after the midnight the incidents had become less in number but that could not be a feature to lead to an assessment of that type. Non -enforcement of the prohibitory orders under S. 144, Cr. P. C., delay imposition of curfwe and non-enforcement of curfew when imposed and the delay in calling in the Army to stand by the civil administration facilitated the riotous mobs to buid-up, operate and bring about the calamity of that proprtion in the city. It may be noted that at several places, such as Calcutta for instance, the Army had  been called in on the 31st October itself.

The stand of the Uttar Pradesh Government that more of incidents of grave type took place after the Army had been called in is not  fully correct. As the statement of Brig. Kohli shows, the Army took position in different areas by 1 p.m. of 1st November and till 11:15 p.m. that night the Army did not have occasion to face crowd engaged in arson, looting or killing to require resort to firing. It is only then that two rounds were fired wtihin Kakadeo Police Station as a result of which two rioters died. This firing had followed a magisterial order to disperse the rioters mob.

It is in evidence that the police did not render appropriate assistance when the riotous mobs attacked the houses, commercial premesis and Gurudwaras, looted them and committed arson. There is also allegation that the police officers remained as bystanders when these offences were being committed. In some of the affidavits it was alleged that even police participated in the riots by supporting openly the mobs. These allegations were invetigated through the Commission’s Investigating Agency and it had been found that whiel there is no material to form the basis of  a finding that the police had actually participated in the riots, police indifference and becoming onlookers when incidents took place have been found. The Commission had scrutinised the material on which the Investigating Agency has recorded such conclusions and is of the view that the conclusions are proper. Such conclusion of the Investigating Agency is also supported by the affidavits on record as also the evidence of deponents examined by the Commission. On the basis of such material the Commission records a finding that the police did not act upto expectation and did not behave as a disciplined force. It is possible that like every other Indian the policemen were also stunned when they got the information of Smt. Gandi’s injuries by gunshot in the hands of securitymen and her succumbing to these injuries but the discipline of  a proffessional force should have got them out of the stuuning effect when the call of duty came and they should  have behaved as policemen meant to protect the lives and properties of the citizens. At that point they could not become passive and silent spectators.