C
H A P T E R - 9
D E L H I R A I L W A Y P O L I C E
DCP
(Crime & Railways)
: Shri R.C. Kohli
ACP (Railways)
: Shri Darshan Kumar
ACP (Crime)
: Shri Kewal Krishan
SHO Police Station
:
Inspector Tarsem Pal Sharma
Delhi Main Railway
Station
SHO P.S. New Delhi
: Inspector Sadhu Singh
Railway Station
9.1. The
Delhi Railway Police under the charge of a Deputy Commissioner of Police
functions as part of the local set-up of the Union Territory
of Delhi. In November,
1984, there were two Police Stations – the Delhi Main and New Delhi Railway
Station. Under the New Delhi Railway Station, there were
two Police Posts, viz., Nizamuddin and Kishanganj.
Similarly ,under the Delhi Main there were Police Posts at Subzi
Mandi, Sarai Rohilla and Shahdara. All
these were supervised by an Assistant Commissioner of Police
and the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Crime & Railways).
9.2. The
railway authorities reported 46
unauthorized stoppages of trains during the riots at various places
and killing of about 160 Sikh passengers
who were traveling to and from Delhi on 1st and 2nd
November, 1984. These
incidents have been clearly
brought out in D.O. letter No. 30/SIB(I) HQ/84 dated 7.12.1984 from Shri
S.P. Banerjee, Chief Security Officer, Northern Railway, New Delhi, addressed
to Shri S.S. Jog , the then Commissioner of Police, and d.o. letter
No. SR/HC/Misc./85 dated 23rd/31st December, 1985
from Shri Prakash Bhalla, General manager, Northern Railways to Shri R.L.
Gupta, Secretary of the Misra Commission.
9.3. The
Railway Stations which were seriously affected were Tughlakabad, Nangloi
and Daya Basti within the jurisdiction of New Delhi Railway Police Station,
besides Palam, Bijwasan, Cantonment and Yamuna Bridge
within the jurisdiction of Delhi Main Police Station.
The events at these Railway Stations are being briefly discussed
as under :-
R.S.
TUGHLAKABAD
9.4. The
first indication that trouble had started at the Railway
Stations was evident from a message which was received in the Police
Control Room at 1025 hrs on 1.11.84 to the effect that the Frontier Mail
had been stopped at Tughlakabad
by a mob which was searching
for Sikh passengers and assaulting them. Similar entries are also found
in the log of DCP(C&R) at 10.27 hrs and10.57 hrs.
PCR asked one of the Wireless Control Vans to verify this report.
After verification, PCR flashed collective signal at 10.54 hrs
to all police officers to the effect that ‘Sikh Passengers were
being taken down from the Frontier Mail at Tughlakabad and were
being assaulted.’
9.5. These
messages were sufficient to have woken up
the entire Delhi Railway Police from DCP downward.
Ordinarily , they should have initiated immediate precautionary
measures so as to ensure a safe passage of trains at all stations/places
within the Union Territory
of Delhi. However, this was
not to be. At Tughlakabad
Station itself on 1.11.1984 after the Frontier Mail, 25 Down Deluxe was
stopped. This was followed
by 149 Down Qutab Express at 11.30 hrs; 23 Down
Bombay –Ferozepur Janta Express
at 12.40 hrs; 382 up at 13.35 hrs; 131 Down Cochin Nizammudin Express
at 1700 hrs; 359 and363 Down;
364 up; 378 Up; 182 Up Sarvodaya Express at 20.35 hrs; 3 Down Frontier
Mail at 20.42 hrs. The mob also damaged the starter signals at Tughlakabad
at about 16.00 hrs. Therefore,
mail trains which normally did not halt here had to stop at Tughlakabad.
The trains which were stopped were
131 Down etc.
On 2.11.1984, 6 Up Punjab Mail which arrived at 09.40 hrs was stopped
followed by 25 Down Deluxe; 151 Down Rajdhani at 10.45 hrs. It
is after all these stoppages and killing
of about 74 Sikhs
passengers at Tughlakabad
alone that Railway Authorities cancelled the trains.
The army then took over the Tughlakabad
Railway Station, its installations and the Railway Colony nearby
where there had been trouble.
9.6.
The Delhi Railway Police had full knowledge of all these incidents.
The DCP in his report vide his letter No. 28284 /Estt. Cr. Dated
18.12.84 had indicated that the rioters/mobs who had gathered at Railway
Stations had already dispersed except on one occasion when re-enforcements
were rushed and firing was resorted to for controlling the incident.
This statement is incorrect and at variance with the report of
the SHO and the facts recorded in the FIRs . In
his report, SHO NDLS, in reply to a TP message
dated 26.11.84 clearly
states in respect of FIR No. 355 that “ on receiving information,
SI Ajit Parshad
charge PP H.N.Z.M. reached the spot.
SHO PS NDLS, ACP Railways, DCP(C&R) also reached the spot along
with supplement force and
rescued the train from being burnt”.
In respect of FIR
357 dated 2.11.84 he says “SI Ajit Parshad along with
staff reached the
spot and tried his best to control the mob.
On receipt of this information, the undersigned, CP Railways, DCP(C&R)
along with adequates force reached the spot and by using the force
the mob was dispersed.” As
a matter of fact,
there is evidence on record to show that DCP(South) had also reached
the station. None seem to
have acted effectively. Both
these FIRs related to Tughlakabad .
Similarly, the SHO has shown the presence of the police at Daya
Basti in FIR 354 dated 1.11.84 and Nangloi in FIR
66 dated2.11.84. ACP
Shri Kewal Krishan of Crime Branch who was pressed into
service for Tughlakabad on 2.11.84
and ---- on 1st
November, 1984 has also described the stoppage of two trains 25 Down and
151 Rajdhani at Tughlakabad although FIR
----tions only 25 Down. His
report gives the impression
that even in this solitary case when the police resorted
to firing, it was in the ‘air’, and there were no casualties in
police firing although 18
rounds were fired by the Delhi Police besides the
firing done
by RPF. The version
of the Delhi Railway Police vide report dated 11.3.85 of Kewal Krishan
, ACP, is that they first
resorted to firing and the RPF opened fire subsequently.
This appears to be incorrect
because the IG-cum-Chief
Security Officer has given a full account of the incidents in his d.o. letter No. 30/SIB(I)HQ/84
dated 7.12.84 to Shri S.S.Jog, the then Commissioner of Police, Delhi
. According to him, the RPF
opened fire when the
mob was about to attack the RPF Post where some Sikhs had taken shelter
and on hearing these shots the Delhi Railway Police also opened fire.
He mentioned the incidents at some
length and also the
fact that Sheri Madhu Dandavate, M.P., was traveling in the train – 151
Down Rajdhani which also arrived when 25 Down was still on the platform,
a fact which has been conveniently omitted
in the FIR recorded by SHO New Delhi Railway Station.
9.7.
As far as the attitude of the police is concerned, this has been
graphically described by Prof. Madhu Dandavate (2641) before the Misra
Commission . He was also
cross-examined by the Delhi Administration before the Misra Commission.
A few relevant passages from this affidavit
and evidence are reproduced below :
(a)
“ I found two Sikhs
killed and thrown on the platform and then their dead bodies were set
on fire on the platform. The
police standing on
the platform made
no efforts to prevent either
the killings or the burning of
Sikhs”.
In
his cross-examination, he has stated as follows :
(b)
“ I must have seen 35-40 policemen at the railway station.
They were standing at the foot of the over bridge at the railway
station. When I saw that
the trouble had already started and I apprehended further trouble
ahead, I approached the police…………..
Ultimately some protection was given.
The persons I had
talked l to appeared to be the persons in charge of the police
team. I do not
know his name. He was, however,
in a position to respond and provide a police team immediately.”
He
has described the attitude of the Delhi Police which was incomplete
contrast with the
attitude of the police at
Mathura :-
“
At mathura when the train
stopped, commandos and police party were
already ready for action on the platform.
Therefore, there was not much of influx into the train.
At Tughlakabad, however, the position
was different as already
mentioned.”
9.8. The
presence of Prof. Madhu Dandavate , MP and former Railway Minister, was
perhaps too inconvenient
for the Delhi Police and, therefore, in their various reports they have
invariably avoided mentioning his name
and presence. Smt.
Darshan Kaur (267) and Smt. Gurpreet Kaur (2409) have also given affidavits
regarding the incidents at Tughlakabad.
The Misra Commission examined Shri Suresh Gupta on 29.1.1986.
He was traveling in the same train as Madhu Dandavate, MP,
and had informed Smt. Gurpreet Kaur about her brother S. Surjit
Singh who was killed during
the riots at the Station. From
these affidavits and statements it appears that the police was passive
and not inclined to take effective action against the miscreants. They,
in fact, miserably failed to
discharge their duty.
9.9. Over
15 trains were stopped at Tughlakabad on 1st and 2nd
November, 1984 and
passengers of the various trains were killed or assaulted.
Besides this, 27 Sikhs were killed in the Railway Colony at Tughlakabad in
the night between 1stand 2nd November, 1984. Strangely, only two FIRs
were recorded by the Delhi
Police. FIRs have
not been recorded for each of the separate incidents which took place
at Tughlakabad. This was
perhaps done to minimize the incidents and was clearly irregular , illegal
and amounts to a deliberate
attempt to conceal the magnitude
of the crime committed.
9.10. From
the morning of 1st November, 1984 till the afternoon of 2nd
November, 1984, a large number of trains were stopped at Tughlakabad
one after the other
and about 74 passengers lost their lives due to inefficiency
and callousness of the Delhi Railway Police.
DCP (C&R) has a lot of explaining to do as to why this was
allowed to happen specially as he had been warned as soon as the first
train was stopped at Tughlakabad in the morning of 1st
November, 1984.
R.S.
DAYA BASTI & R.S. NANGLOI
9.11. Violence
also occurred at Daya Basti and Nangloi Railway Stations on 1st
and 2nd November, 1984 .
At Rampura near Daya Basti, Janta Express was detained on 1.11.1984
in connection with which FIR No. 354
was registered at 2.45. PM.
According to the police, on receiving information from ASM, Daya
Basti that a mob had stopped Ferozepur –Bombay Janta Express,
ASI Hukam Singh of Police Post Kishan Ganj went to the scene of
incident and found the mob of about 1000 to 1500. The mob dispersed on seeing the police and four bodies were
found burning. The fire was
extinguished and the train
moved on. Later, one more
body was found and thus a total of 5 persons are stated to have died.
The police does not seem to have taken any effective action against
the mob and merely collected
the dead bodies.
9.12. At
Nangloi on 2.11.1984, 60 Down Abha Express was stopped at 0738 hrs and
attacked by a mob. Another
express train 186 Down Bhiwani Express was stopped at 0845 hrs
and in these two stoppages the mob killed about 20 Sikhs.
In connection with both these incidents
FIR 356 was registered. It
seems that while the Railway Police did
not reach Nangloi, SHO Nangloi PS reached the spot and dispersed
the mob.
9.13. In
the above incidents at Tughlakabad, Daya Basti and Nangloi as per
the FIRs and, the report of the SHO NLD, the Police was present but strangely
not a single culprit was arrested or injured or killed in the firing.
The statement of the DCP that the police only reached after the
mob had dispersed, is not borne out by FIRs 354-357 or from the deployment
charts which show
the presence of police at
Tughlakabad both on 1st
and 2nd November, 1984 and also at Nangloi and Daya Basti. Besides, according to Shri Banerjee, IG-cum-Chief Security
Officer, when 182 Up Sarvodaya Express
arrived at 20.35 hrs at Tughlakabad
on 1.11.84 , ACP with two Sis was present in the
office of C.C., RPF Tughlakabad when two Sikh passengers were killed
and set on fire. He ( the
ACP) came out on the platform and returned back.
Apparently, the ACP did not consider it proper to take any action
for reasons best known to him and even the bodies remained
lying in the yard up to 0500 hrs on 2.11.84.
DCP’s statement that
the police only reached
after the incidents had occurred is an effort to cover up the gross
and deliberates inaction of the Delhi Railway Police.
One hardly expects
an officer of his rank and seniority to make
such incorrect statements which are falsified by official records
and reports of his own subordinates.
More so when he refers to them as ‘correct’ accounts of the incidents.
9.14. The
incidents pertaining to the Railway Stations in the jurisdiction of Delhi
Main Railway Police Station were as follows:-
R.S.
PALAM
9.15.
Incidents took place
at this Railway Station on 1st
November, 1984 when203 Up arrived at the Station and the mob attacked
Sikh passengers and burnt them.
According to the railway authorities
since no police was available, the memo
was sent by S.S., Palam to the civil police through Shri Chand,
porter, but the civil police refused
to accept the memo. The flying
squad could not contacted as the phone was not functioning.
Then after Shri N.L. Khanna, S.S. Palam issued another
memo intimating that
about 7 half-burnt bodies
were lying and requested GRP Sarai Rohilla for their removal
and disposal. On 2nd
November, 1984 another memo was sent by the
railways to GRP Sarai
Rohilla about two more bodies having
been noticed by the public in the yard.
Only one body was removed by the GRP and regarding the other they
advised the railway authorities to approach Delhi Cantt. Police Station.
Finally all these bodies were removed but the railway authorities
were not aware of when and by whom they were finally removed.
The SHO Delhi Main
on the other hand has described the events as follows :-
“
On 1.11.84 at 12.30 hrs a memo was received at PP Sarai Rohilla the contents
of which were :
‘
Three men killed by public at Bijwasan in 203 UP.
Dead body lying at
Station. Please attend and
do needful.’
On
this SI Swaran Singh got the case registered and rushed to the spot along
with the staff. During the
course of investigation information was received that seven more dead
bodies thrown from the same train i.e. 203 Up Ahmedabad Express and were
lying at Palam Railway Station.
I.O. and SHO rushed to the spot and needful
was done. However,
no mob could be seen at both these places.”
9.16. It will be seen from the above that the versions
of the railways and the Delhi Police are at variance with one another.
The fact, however, remains that 203 UP
was stopped both at Palam and Bijwasan and passengers were pulled
out and killed. These
incidents occurred even after
the general alert by the PCR
about attacks on trains. Apparently,
since the train was the same, the Delhi Railway Police only registered
one case viz. FIR 483.
R.S.
YAMUNA BRIDGE
9.17.
At this station 32 Down was detained and on receipt of a memo at1315
hrs on 2.11.84 , one Sub Inspector was detailed from the Railway Police.
Four Sikhs were found dead and two injured who later died.
In this incident FIR 484
was registered at
15.05 hrs. The actual number of killings was more as some bodies
were lying outside the train at Yamuna Bridge as per message in wireless
log book of PCR.
R.S.
DELHI CANTT
9.18.
On 2.11.1984 at 11.00 hrs, a memo was sent by SS Delhi Cantt. Railway
Station to SHO Delhi Main that one person was lying dead on platform No.
1 at Delhi Cantt.
Yard. On this memo, FIR 485
was registered at
1545 hrs. The report of the
SHO dated 28.3.85 mentions the total of
8 bodies. Perhaps
bodies recovered from Palam and other trains have been included.
9.19.
Besides these incidents, dead bodies were recovered at the Railway
Station from 204 Down on 1.11.84 and 502 Down Pink City, 2 RD from Gurgaon
and 32 Down on 2.11.84.
9.20. According
to the SHO, the police only arrived
after the incidents had taken place and after the crowd had already
dispersed. This SHO also
has combined incidents at various places
into FIRs 483, 484 and 485.
About 36 bodies were picked up at various places from 1st
to 3rdNovember, 1984. The worst affected being
Palam.
9.21. From
a perusal of the available records, reports and statements , it seems
apparent that DCP (Railway) and his subordinates completely lacked the
will to come to grips with the situation.
The first signal that trouble was brewing came on the
morning of 1st November, 1984 when the Frontier mail
was held up at 0950 hrs at Tughlakabad and later trains were held up at
Tughlakabad till the afternoon of 2nd November, 1984 and the
police apparently remained silent spectators to the gruesome crimes which
were committed.
9.22. The
plea that there was not adequate staff
does not bold water because even the existing staff does not appear
to have been properly utilized.
At New Delhi Railway Station, one SHO, 6 Sis, 9 ASIs, 15Head Constables
and 57 Constables were available. However,
the deployment chart shows that only 7 Sis, 5 ASIs 7 Head Constables
and 24 Constables were put on law and order duty.
This means nearly 50 per cent
of the staff was not deployed on field duty even when the situation
was critical. Similarly,
against available strength
at Delhi Main of 10 Sis, 4 ASIs, 21 Head Constables and 91 Constables,
only 6 Sis, 4 ASIs, 14 Head Constables and 43 Constables were put on law
and order duty. One
would have
expected that if trouble was anticipated other staff would also
have been withdrawn from miscellaneous duties and put on law and order
duties. Even the outside
force which reported for duty at these
two Railway Stations does not seem to have been properly briefed
or effectively utilized. The police force was, therefore , a silent spectator
and allowed the mobs to roam around unhindered on the Railway Stations,
hold up trains and kill Sikh passengers.
Prof. Madhu Dandawate, MP’s affidavit gives
a clear picture of the attitude of the police in no uncertain terms.
He clearly brings home the fact that the police did not act as
a disciplined force
meant to preserve law and order.
The officers are, therefore, clearly responsible for dereliction
of duty.
9.23.
The police also made every effort to minimize the crime as they
did not accept memos sent by the Railway Authorities,
combined a large number of incidents into one FIR and omitted recording
FIRs in respect of some of the incidents.
For instance, at Tughlakabad
where so many trains were stopped
and passengers killed and burnt only two
FIRs have been recorded.
Not a single person was arrested, no tear-gas was used to disperse
the mobs and even when the police resorted to firing after the RPF had
opened fire no one was hurt or injured is this firing.
This clearly shows that the police was not serious about discharging
their duty.
9.24.
The two ACPs S/Shri Darshan Kumar and Kewal Krishan who were present
at Tughlakabad on 1st and 2nd November, 1984 respectively,
did precious little to control the situation.
As far as the DCP (Railways) is concerned, Shri Kohli failed to
discharge his duties as DCP(Railways) and failed to provide the necessary
leadership and guidance to his subordinates.
He literally failed to rise to the occasion and has given a very
poor account of himself as a senior police officer.
In spite of a clear
message on 1.11.84 at 10.27 AM regarding trouble at Okhla and Tughlakabad,
he took no effective steps to control the situation even at Tughlakabad
which was the scene of repeated
killings. He has tried
to make out that mob disappeared when police reached trouble spots when
the facts are otherwise even in police records e.g. FIR 355 and 357 discussed
earlier.
9.25.
It is clear from the records that Shri Darshan Kumar ACP(Railways)
was present at Tughlakabad Railway Station in the evening of 1.11.84 and
even when he saw the killings taking place in his presence he took
no action. He, therefore,
failed to discharge his duties as ACP(Railways).
It is, however, understood
that he has since retired from service and, therefore, no specific recommendation
is being made regarding him.
9.26. From
the report of Shri Kewal Krishan dated 11.3.85, it is clear that he was
pressed into service by DCP
on 2.11.84 at about 10.30 AM. He
become functional only at about 11.50 AM when he reached Tughlakabad Railway
Station and firing was resorted to both by the RPF and the Delhi Police.
By the time Shri Kewal Krishan was pressed into service, most of
the incidents at the Railway Stations and in the trains were already over
and the Railways had decided
to stop further movement of trains.
9.27. DCP(Railways)
‘s statement/report dated 18.12.84
that he pressed the Crime Branch staff because of shortage of manpower
is somewhat misleading because he did not press the staff into serve on
the 1st November but on the 2nd November by which time the
damage had already been done. Further
it is also clear that the police opened fire only in the ‘air’ and this
did not act as a deterrent to the rioters.
The DCP(Railways) has also tried to minimize the number of incidents
of rioting and holding up of trains because he merely mentions 7 incidents
of rioting, holding up trains and gatherings of persons at various Railway
installations during the riots.
This is an under-statement because the picture which emerges from
the D.O. letter No. 30/SIB(I)/HS/84 dated 7.12.84 from IS-cum-Chief Security
Officer, Northern Railways, addressed to the then Police Commissioner
Shri S.S.Jog, is quite different,
DCP (Crime and Railways ) has obviously tried to minimize the incidents
and killings in an attempt to cover up the lapses of the police
and the seriousness of the situation.
There was, in fact, total failure on the part of the
Railway Police to control the situation
and discharge their
duties. It is under stood that Shri Kewal Krishan has also
since retired from service and, therefore, it is not proposed to
recommend any action for his failure.
In any case he was pressed into service only on the 2nd
November, 1984 by which time most of the damage had already been done.
RECOMMENDATION
9.28. In the light of the above, it is necessary that suitable disciplinary action should be taken against DCP(Railways) as well as the two SHOs S/Shri T.P. Sharma and Sadhu Singh for their negligence and dereliction of duty and failure to maintain law and order at the Railway Stations which resulted in avoidable loss of life and property.
