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H A P T E R - 1
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D E L H I A R M E D P O L I C E
10.1.
The Delhi Armed Police
consists of ten Battalions under the overall charge of an Additional Commissioner
of Police. However, a scrutiny
of the functioning of the Delhi Armed Police has revealed a shocking state
of affairs . The Delhi Armed
Police apparently does not function on the pattern of traditional
Para-military forces like the CRPF and
BSF. Theoretically
each Battalion having 8/9
Companies is under the charge of a Commandant of the rank of DCP with
three Assistant Commissioners of Police
as Supervisory officers and Inspectors as Company Commanders.
However, in proactive the deployment of force is not sent company
or platoon battalion-wise
in Delhi but by numbers i.e. so many Sis, Head Constables and Constables
etc. Besides, there is inter-changeability at all levels between the DAP, and the normal Delhi Police at the Police Stations.
This has resulted in DAP being utilized in the same manner as reserve
lines in other States and has seriously affected the efficiency and utility
of the DAP. Another factor
which came to light was the fact that none of the Battalion Commandants
or Assistant Commissioners of Police commanded the force when it
was sent on duty during the riots.
Hence the supervisory staff did not go out at all with the force
which is indeed unfortunate as will be discussed subsequently.
10.2.
Immediately after the riots, DCP(Vigilance) Shri N.S. Rana, was
ordered to look into the mobilization of the DAP during the riots.
He submitted a report dated 2.3.1985 to Addl. C.P.(CID) which also
highlights the short-comings in
the functioning of the DAP. From
the statistics which were collected by DCP(Vigilance) the picture which
emerges is that the posted strength of all the 10 Battalions as on 31.10.1984
was as follows:
DCP
ACP
INSPECTORS
SI's.
H/Cs.
Constables
10
30
81
317
1726
7283
Against
this posted strength, according to the D.D. entries of the DAP, only the
following force was actually sent/dispatched on various dates for law
and order duties:-
DATE
INSPECTORS
S.I.s H/Cs.
Constables
31.10.84
7
33
158
1,100
1.11.84
13
58
292
2,059
2.11.84
4
21
95
805
3.11.84
6
51
180
1,409
4.11.84
2
11
87
663
The
above figures clearly show that against the posted strength, a miserably
small amount of force was sent on duty on any
one day. For instance
against 81 Inspectors, the maximum
number sent on any day is 13. Against
the 317 Sis, the maximum number sent on any day is 58.
Against 1726 Head Constables, the maximum number sent on any day
was 292. Similarly, against
7,283 Constables, the maximum sent
on any day was 2,059. Indeed,
as ad commentary on the functioning of the DAP in a crisis situation.
10.3.
A further scrutiny of the figures collected by the DCP(Vig.) shows
that the number of persons on ‘essential duties’ was extremely high as
would be clear from the figures given below :-
DATE
INSPECTORS
Sis H/Cs.
Constables
30.10.84
30
177
826
2,961
31.10.84
22
124
684
2,587
1.11.84
22
144
560
2,575
2.11.84
21
129
652
2,549
3.11.84
21
129
639
2,381
4.11.84
21
129
642
2,416
The
so-called ‘essential duties’ performed in the Battalion thus
account for more than 30 per cent of the total strength.
Adding to these figures the number of men on leave or on temporary
attachment etc., we find that on an average less than 40 per cent
of the force was available for duty, e.g. on 31.10.84, Inspector
38, Sis 117, HCs 726 and
Constables 3433 only were available for duty.
It, therefore, needs serious consideration whether there is any
utility in retaining a force where less than 40% is available for
active duty even in a crisis situation of the kind that Delhi was faced
with in November 1984 riots
and even that was not fully utilized as shown
in para 2 above.
10.4.
Extract of the chart prepared by DCP(Vig) as well as the actual
deployment according to the
general diaries of the DAP from 31st October, 1984 to 4th
November, 1984 are given in the Annexure.
These figures reveal a pathetic state of affairs.
Take for instance
one small example. The 8th
Battalion had on the 31st October, 1984, 28 Sis, 158 Head
Constables and 696 Constables out of which 13 SIs,
76 Head constables and 417 Constables were on essential duties.
Five Sis, 31 Head Constables and 83 Constables were on leave etc.
One SI, 20 Head Constables and 41 Constables were on some temporary
attachment. Therefore, the
battalion as on 31.10.84 was left with 9 Sis, 31 Head Constables
and 155
Constables. The utility
of Government maintaining such a Battalion needs to be seriously considered.
10.5.
The above situation has also been highlighted in the note of DCP(Vig)
from the Special Enquiry Cell No. XXV 101/85 dated 2.3.85 which is worth
reproducing :
“ As desired, the records of the DAP have been thoroughly examined
to find out the actual position of deployment of force by the various
DAP Bns. , from 30.10.84 to 4.11.84 inclusive.
The Coy. Havaldar
Majora (CHMS) of all the 10 DAP Bns. Were called to Vigilance Office ,
along with their Coy daily duty rosters. On the basis of this record, we were able to find out :-
(a)
The total strength mobilized by the Coy
and sent for law and order duties; and
(b)
The total strength which remained available with the Coy from day-to-day
as standby /stand to/ surplus.
This
detailed record may kindly
be seen in the linked file which is placed below.
“ On the basis of the Coy-wise daily deployment charts, we have
prepared the Bn-wise data at flag ‘A’.
This shows the day-to-day total mobilization of each Bn., the total
surplus remaining in the
Bn and the total essential duties carried out by the Bn .
This shows considerable variation from day-to-day in the
different units. A
large amount of force in each Battalion remains unaccounted for and it
appears that the routine pickets had
remained functioning thorough
out and were not disbanded to mobilize extra force at any time.
It is suggested that
the respective DCPs of DAP Bns may be asked to clarify the position in
detail as their posted strength in each BN. Remains unaccounted for from
day-to-day even after accepting in to their statements of so-called essential
duties in the Bn. And even after taking into account the surplus
force figures submitted by the CHMS and BHMS.
For example, on 2.11.84 ,
152 Constables were sent for deployment by the 1st Bn. Another 97 Constables
remained surplus within the Bn. Premises and another 326 were supposedly
on ‘essential duties’ within the
Bn. Premises. This gives a total of 575 Constables, whereas there are 846
Constables drawing pay from the 1st Bn.
Similarly, in the5th Bn on
1.11.84, 179 Constables were sent for law and order duties, 21
remained stand by or surplus within the Bn. And 217 remained on ‘essential
duties’ within the Bn. Giving a total of 417, whereas the posted strength
of Constables in this Bn. Is689.
It is doubtful if even after subtracting any static or picket duties
from this figure the strength could
be accounted for properly.
“ The overall surpluses which remained present within the DAP complex
during these fixed days in the form of stand by or stand to etc. May be
seen at Flag ‘B’. This shows
that between 574 and 1080 Constables remained undeployed in the DAP daily
from 31.10.84 to 4.11.84.
“ This exercise has also brought out the astonishing fact that
in normal times i.e. on 30.10.84, 30 Inspectors, 177 Sis/ASIs,
826 HCs and 2956 Constables of DAP Bns remained busy with the so-called
essential duties of their Bns, as many as 438Constables out of the total
posted strength of 696 Constables
is found to be engaged in ‘essential duties’ of the Bn.
And therefore, not available for day-to-day deployment.
“ Perhaps a complete overhaul of the system of deployment of DAP
is called for here after obtaining the comments of the concerned DCPs.”
10.6. Shri O.P. Mehra, Deputy Commissioner of Police, 1st
Bn. DAP vide his letter No. 2684/Gen. 1st
Bn. Dated 16,3,85
addressed to the Addl. Commissioner of Police (CID), on the other hand,
has given a different picture which is hard to believe.
According to him, the DAP was supplying
as much as was requisitioned
by the PHQ PCR the previous evening.
According to him, the
following staff was deployed
for law and order duties during the riots:-
DATE
INSPECTORS
Sis H/Cs
Constables
31.10.84
24
73
529
3,111
1.11.84
33
109
658
4,080
2.11.84
31
105
613
3,846
3.11.84
35
111
698
4,251
4.11.84
39
110
694
4,277
These
figures are not supported by the DD entries as indicated in para 2 above.
DD entries are comparatively more authentic, it is, therefore, not possible
to accept the version of Shri Mehra since it is not borne out by facts.
10.7.
Even if some fixed pickets which may not have been disbanded and
a few Sikh personnel
who were not sent on active duty, are taken into account, the discrepancy
in the force stated to be
mobilized and the one actually deployed for law and order duties during
the riots, cannot be reconciled.
Therefore, a thorough
scrutiny needs to be done as to why against the posted strength
so few hands were available and
why even those were not sent on duty.
10.8.
Another fact which
is very obvious but at the
same time surprising is that the supervisory officers did not accompany
the force. The statements
given by the various Assistant Commissioners of Police, DAP show that
most of them were at the Bn Hqrs. Or at their residences and were not
utilized at all. A study
of the reports sent by the various Battalions showing movement of DCPs
and ACPs shows that Mrs. Vimla Mehra, DCP 4th Bn was on duty
at Teen Murti House on 1st
and 2nd November, 1984 and on route duty on 3rd
November. Shri A.S.Khan DCP
, 8th Bn was also on
route duty on 3rd November, 1984.
Similarly, only 3 ACPs were put on any kind of duty.
Thus out of 10 DCPs and
30 ACPs, only 2 DCPs and 3 ACPs were utilized and rest
stayed in the DAP
office or in their houses doing nothing.
This brings to mind the observations of the National Police Commission
reproduced below:-
“
47.7.
We have been told of
several instances where police forces were deployed
without any briefing whatsoever.
Even the senior officers
deployed with the force were inadequately briefed, with the result
that they could not act decisively in a moment of crisis. Moreover, in some cases of recent riots the armed police detailed
to supplement the resources of the
district police was collected at very short notice from different
units, wherever they
could be made available from.
Such a body of men not under the command of their own officers
can hardly be expected to operate in a disciplined and concerted manner. We strongly deprecate such a practice and recommend that the
armed police should move
only in proper formation, along with full complement of their officers.”
(SIXTH REPORT OF THE NATIONAL POLICE, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MARCH
1981)
10.9.
Lack of leadership, proper utilization
and coordination, was perhaps the reason why the force being deputed
from the DAP Headquarters was either not reporting to the district concerned
or was reporting with delay. There are quite a few instances where the
force sent out on duty came back to Lines allegedly due to obstruction
by mobs. It is
indeed pathetic that units of armed police sent out on law and
order duty came back to the Lines and do not reach their destination.
Besides cowardice, an armed force surrendering
to the wishes of the unruly mobs shows lack of discipline and unwillingness
to act. Had the supervisory
officers gone along with their men such
a situation might not have occurred.
Considerable delay in the actual dispatch of the force has also
come to notice and there are a number of messages from various
districts in the wireless
logs which indicate that force said to have been dispatched had not reached
the districts. A thorough investigation as to what actually transpired,
and, why force was not sent
in time, needs to be undertaken
so as to avoid the same mistakes and lapses in future.
10.10.
On the one hand DAP was not providing adequate force to the districts,
on the other hand instances have come to notice where the force has remained
confined in the control rooms of the districts and was not properly utilized.
This appears to be more prominent in West and East Districts. In
the West District, for instance, two companies reported at district control at 0700
hrs. on 1.11.84. There
is, however, no indication of how they were deployed and they apparently remained in the control room only.
Similarly, on subsequent
days this practice continued.
In the East District also, one company and two platoons were received
on 1st November, 1984 at 6.00 AM and
1242 hrs.
Again, two platoons and one section were received on 2nd
November, 1984 at 10.25 hrs. How they were distributed among the police stations is not
quite clear. Thus, on the
one hand, there was complaint
of shortage of staff and ,
on the other hand, there was no proper utilization. Evidently, the will either to deploy or to utilize the force
properly was completely lacking.
The Commissioner of Police failed to see that the existing staff
was not being deployed
or utilized properly.
RECOMMENDATIONS
10.11.
Taking an overall view, since the Delhi Armed Police on its own
has no independent role to play and is deputed to the various districts
in aid of the civil police, it is not proposed to
make any recommendation against the officers concerned.
However, the following
observations are made for the consideration of the Delhi Administration:-
(a)
The amount of force available for duty out of the total posted
manpower of DAP was extremely small.
The purpose of having reserve Battalions is to have a standing
back-up force available for emergent duties.
If less than 40 per cent of the force of any battalion is available
for duty and the bulk of it is utilized for maintaining itself, there
is no justification for having it in the present form. ----------
having it in the present
form, district reserves should be formed with each district under the
control of the concerned Deputy Commissioner of Police.
(b)
In case the present form of the Armed Battalions is to be maintained,
the unit should be formed on the pattern of Para-military forces like
CRPF or BSF and given
proper training. They
should be deli ked from Delhi Police and should not be interchangeable,
specially at the lower levels, with the district police.
This will ensure that they do not form
local links and function in a professional manner.
The exact operational strength of the force should be laid down
so as to avoid large scale wastage of manpower on so-called ‘essential
duties’.
(c)
The practice of deputing force by numbers should cease and the
force should be sent with the full complement of supervisory officers
to command their men. The
purpose of having the supervisory officers is that the Armed Police should
function and operate in a disciplined and concerted manner.
If this is done the men will have a sense of belonging to a force
and will look up to their officers for guidance and we might not have
the situations where the
force returns to the unit instead of reaching its destination for duty
Senior Officers are
provided so that they can lead their men, otherwise there is no sense
in having the senior officers with each battalion.
Hardly any DCP was sent on duty
during the riots and the senior officers wasted their time at the
DAP Headquarters while Delhi was burning.
This was scandalous and must be
avoided in future.
(d) In case it is felt that due to large scale interchangeability in the past it is difficult now to discipline the lower cadres, the present staff of the DAP from Inspector downwards should be merged with the Delhi Police and the Central Government may consider raising fresh Central Battalions which are trained in a professional manner right from the beginning. These will not have a past history of local influences which are difficult to over come. This will also ensure that in Delhi or elsewhere this Central Police can be sent in times of crisis and is not subjected to pressures at the local level
